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Abstract. This paper addresses the normative relationship between changes in technology and 
technical efficiency and the exploitation of common renewable resources. These changes can 
exacerbate the commons problem and deepen the externality. Their impact depends on the rate 
and nature of change, levels of effort and resource stock, and state of property rights. The paper 
develops an augmented fundamental equation of renewable resource economics with a modified 
marginal stock effect and a new marginal technology effect term that account for changes in 
technology and technical efficiency. Neglecting these changes generates misleading policy 
advice. An empirical application illustrates the results. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Technical progress and gains in economic efficiency are generally viewed as favorably 
contributing to economic growth and welfare, but does this normative conclusion hold for 
industries exploiting common renewable resources? What are their effects on the paradox 
between the individual firm’s private economic efficiency and economic efficiency and social 
costs at the level of society with common renewable resources (Gordon 1954)?  In short, what is 
the relationship between technical change and a broad notion of efficiency with the “Tragedy of 
the Commons” and the optimum exploitation of common renewable resources? 
The normative economics literature on common renewable resources has largely 
overlooked technical change and its effects, instead focusing on steady-state levels of effort or 
capital stock, resource stock, yield, and their dynamic approaches under constant technology.1 
Smith (1972), an exception, examined induced technological change and common renewable 
resources, finding that an unpriced common resource induces technical change in favor of 
increased utilization of the unpriced resource and that the competitive pressures of the race to fish 
can compel firms to adopt process innovations. Dasgupta (2008) recently reiterated these points 
and further discussed the relationship between technical change (and economic growth) and the 
shadow price of common renewable resources and other forms of natural capital and the role of 
property rights. Smith and Krutilla (1982) observed that technical change under open access 
accelerates the dissipation of resource rent and depletes resource stocks that are already 
overexploited.2 McAusland (2005) considered technical progress that directly affects the intrinsic 
growth rate of the resource stock but not the production technology, and was not concerned with 
direct normative economic optimization of resource exploitation. Murray (2007) introduced 
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exogenous and disembodied technical progress into a static Gordon-Schaefer model of a fishery 
to show that not accounting for technological change can lead to overestimated natural growth of 
the resource stock and that inputs must be removed from the fishery at the rate of technological 
change to sustain the harvest target, and simulated the probability of resource stock collapse. In 
short, the normative literature has yet to formally analyze the impact of technical progress upon 
optimum exploitation of common renewable resources within a formal normative framework. 
This literature has considered non-autonomous models, but focused on exogenous price shocks 
(Clark 1990). This normative literature has similarly overlooked the notion of economic 
efficiency developed by Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957), to instead concentrate solely on the 
efficient scale of production, i.e. on the optimum level of effort.3  
In contrast, the normative exhaustible resource and sustainable growth literature has paid 
considerably more attention to technical progress and to substitution possibilities between the 
resource stock and inputs in discussions of natural resource scarcity, limits to growth, and 
backstop technologies (Arrow et al. 2004, Simpson et al. 2005). Farzin (1995), Berck (1995), and 
d’Autume and Schubert (2008) summarized the literature on technical progress and exhaustible 
resources and focused upon the impact of technical change on measures of resource scarcity. 
Climate change and the need to reduce fossil fuel and carbon emissions are focusing considerable 
attention upon induced technical change, with recent surveys by Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2003) 
and Pizer and Popp (2007).  
This paper contributes to the normative economic literatures on technical change, 
efficiency, and optimum exploitation of renewable resources by introducing both output-oriented 
Debreu-Farrell technical inefficiency and technical progress into normative static and dynamic 
models of an industry exploiting a common renewable resource and examining the economic and 
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policy ramifications. The paper develops the bioeconomic stages of production and clarifies that 
normative renewable resource models focus solely on scale efficiency and overlook technical and 
allocative efficiency. The most important contribution is an augmented fundamental equation of 
renewable resource economics that incorporates changes in technology and technical inefficiency 
into a new term, the marginal technology effect, and modifies the existing marginal stock effect. 
The results show that lower costs from technology generally outweigh lower costs from a higher 
resource stock and that resource stock levels can decline far below the steady-state equilibrium 
with static technology. The renewable resource model is developed for a fishery using the classic 
Gordon-Schaefer specification (Schaefer 1957, Gordon 1954), which lies at the heart of this 
literature and allows direct and analytic development of the modified Golden Rule.4 The technical 
change specified is disembodied, exogenous, and learning-by-doing and -using.5  
Overlooking technical progress and technical efficiency in common renewable resource 
industries in a normative framework has profound policy consequences through exacerbating the 
commons problem under open access or potentially generating misleading policy advice in terms 
of economic optimum levels of the resource stock, yield, effort (input use), and economic welfare. 
In fishing industries, for example, once fish could no longer hide from vessels that are 
increasingly more technologically advanced, the stage was set for the current overfishing crisis in 
many of the world’s fisheries.6 In fact, perhaps the single greatest pressure on global fisheries is 
technical progress, now that fishing fleets’ capital stocks have built up to an overcapitalized state, 
but policy advice that remains focused solely on reducing capital stocks, fishing effort, or 
subsidies overlooks the ongoing march of technology that allows even reduced capital stock or 
effort to be more effective at finding and harvesting fish. Similarly, technical progress contributed 
mightily to the decimation of many of the great whale stocks (Davis et al. 1987).  
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Section 2 develops a stochastic stock-flow production frontier incorporating technical 
change and technical inefficiency. Section 3 introduces this production frontier into the simple 
static Schaefer model that forms the basis of Section 4’s static Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic 
model, the workhorse of renewable resource economics, examining the Nash equilibrium of open 
access. Section 5 extends the Gordon-Schaefer rent frontier to the static steady-state Pareto 
optimum, i.e. the sole owner of Scott (1955).  Section 6 develops the backward bending supply 
curve with technical progress and inefficiency based on the static Gordon-Schaefer rent frontier. 
Section 7 develops a simple normative dynamic model of the economic optimum incorporating 
technical inefficiency and technical change, culminating with an augmented Golden Rule or 
fundamental equation of renewable resources incorporating the new marginal technology effect 
term and a modified marginal stock effect. Section 8 considers several policies. Section 9 
introduces the empirical application. The unavailability of detailed capital and investment data for 
the empirical example precludes an empirical analysis of embodied technical change. Section 10 
provides the empirical results. Section 11 provides concluding remarks. The main static results 
are summarized in Table 1 for conditions with and without technical change or technical 
efficiency. Table 2 summarizes the main dynamic model results. All derivations in the paper are 
available in a separate Appendix from the authors. 
2. Fishery Production Frontier 
The stock-flow production function in time t relates catch,
  
Yt , to the fish stock, 
  
St , and 
fishing effort, 
  
Et  (Schaefer 1957): 
  
Yt = f (q,Et ,St ).7 Catch is the output or flow from the resource 
stock, and the resource stock and fishing effort are specified as aggregate inputs. Effort is 
typically considered as the first stage in a two-stage production process and implicitly assumes 
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weak or strong separability of 
  
Et  from 
  
St  and 
  
Yt , or Leontief aggregation, to form a composite 
index of inputs (Hannesson 1983, Squires 1987). The catchability coefficient, 
  
q > 0 , is the 
probability that one unit of effort taken at random will catch one unit of the population taken at 
random.8 The classic bioeconomic model specifies a specific form of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function:
  
Yt = qEtSt , which has strong separability. A non-linear but positive exponent 
for the resource stock is possible depending on the nature of the fishery, giving 
  
Yt = qEtStβ , where 
  
β =1 implies evenly distributed fish and where schooling fish have lower positive values closer to 
zero (Hannesson 1993), as considered later in the paper. 
Introducing time-varying output-oriented technical efficiency (TE) gives 
  
Yt = qStEte−µ(t ,Z ), 
where 
  
−µ(t,Z) denotes a nonpositive, half-sided error term that introduces deviations from the 
best-practice frontier or technical inefficiency.9 The measure for technical efficiency (TE) is 
  
exp{−µ(t,Z)} ≤1. Technical inefficiency arises when TE < 1 and grows with increases in ),( Ztµ . 
Technical inefficiency accounts for the time it may take for new technologies to attain their full 
productive potential and diffusion after their introduction, poorly designed regulation, the firm’s 
managerial failure, and efficiency differences in harvesting units. The vector Z could include 
policy variables Ψ determined by the regulator that induce technical inefficiency or Z could 
include managerial (or crew) effort to allow for asymmetric information or different structures in 
incentives, such as alternative ownership structures or property rights.  
Technical change, specified as exogenous, disembodied, and captured by a linear time 
trend t, can be introduced into the Graham-Schaefer surplus production frontier to give:10  
     
  
Yt = qStEteλt−µ(t ,Z )  .                                                        (1) 
The parameter
  
λ > (<)0  measures the rate of technical progress (regress), shifting the best-practice 
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frontier, and t denotes time. Technical change in (1) is necessarily Hick’s-neutral with a single 
input, is output-augmenting (and equivalently input-augmenting with a composite input and linear 
homogeneity of the effort aggregator function), and could be easily specified to allow technical 
change which is non-neutral and which is not constant (through addition of interactions 
  
Ett , 
  
Stt , 
and 
  
t 2 to 
  
eλt ); this is considered later in the paper, but initially for simplicity we retain the Hick’s 
neutrality and constant rate.11 (Under open access, non-neutral technical change interacting with 
the resource stock should be biased toward resource-using, which accelerates the externality or 
commons problem as discussed by Smith (1972) and Ruttan (2001) and which we address later in 
the paper.) A more general index of autonomous technical change, 
  
A t( ), such as that of Baltagi 
and Griffin (1988), is easily substituted and is also employed in the empirical application, 
allowing technical change to vary in rate and direction in each time period, readily accommodates 
biases, and gives the specification of (1) as:  
  
Yt = qA t( )StEte−µ(t ,Z ).12 
Technical change in (1) can in part be viewed as a learning-by-doing and -using (Arrow 
1962, Rosenberg 1982), once exogenous innovations have been introduced.13 Usually no formal 
R&D is devoted to technological advances except perhaps in all but the largest, most capital-
intensive, and concentrated fishing industries.14 Firms adopt electronic and other process 
innovations for navigation, communication, finding fish, and monitoring gear performance while 
fishing (and under open access are compelled by the “race to fish”), followed by a period of 
learning (which can be captured by the technical inefficiency term). Some types of technical 
change (often regulatory induced) can mitigate the negative environmental externality of 
undersized fish or undesirable joint products (e.g. bycatch of turtles), but this paper focuses on 
technical change enabling production of desirable outputs at lower cost. Embodied technical 
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change in the fishing vessel can also be important, but the focus here is on continuous and gradual 
smaller process innovations and subsequent learning related to finding fish, especially by the 
firm’s manager (skipper) or learning by doing, and for discovery of new and unanticipated uses of 
the process innovations or learning by using by the manager and labor force (crew). Since 
industries exploiting renewable resources are largely mature, minimal depreciation of the largely 
tacit knowledge acquired through learning is anticipated (although little is known about the 
process by which this tacit knowledge is acquired). Normally, there is no opportunity cost other 
than the current cost of production with learning-by-doing (i.e. without other opportunity costs 
such as crowding out from R&D or knowledge market failures), but as demonstrated below, the 
external cost under incomplete property rights with common resources does create a social 
opportunity cost. There may also be learning benefit spillovers from one firm to the next, but the 
lion’s share of the learning benefits are nonetheless expected to accrue to the firms engaged in the 
learning, especially to the skipper in finding fish (skippers usually own their vessels and inter-
vessel skipper movement is usually limited) and to the crew in handling gear and equipment, 
although learning differences are anticipated among firms.  
3. The Schaefer Model: The Yield-Effort Frontier 
The equilibrium yield-effort function, developed by Schaefer (1957), starts with the net 
growth rate of the biomass specified as a simple differential equation: 
  
dSt dt = F(St ) −Yt , where 
  
F(St )  denotes a general growth function of the resource stock measured in biomass. Substituting 
(1) and the logistic or Pearl-Verhulst growth function15 into 
  
dSt dt = F(St ) −Yt : 
    ),(1 Ztttt
t
t
t eEqS
K
S
rS
dt
dS µλ −−⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡ −=  ,               (2)
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where r is the maximum intrinsic growth rate of 
  
St , i.e. 
  
r = limt→0
dSt dt
St
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥  and K is the carrying 
capacity, 
  
limt→∞ St = K  with zero harvest. In steady-state equilibrium, the instantaneous rate of 
change in the population is zero, i.e. 
  
dSt dt = 0 .16  
Solving for the steady-state level of the biomass allowing for output-oriented technical 
inefficiency and technical progress gives for the Graham-Schaefer surplus production frontier: 
    ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−=
−
r
eqEKS
Ztt
ttTE
),(
, 1
µλ
 .                   (3) 
The steady-state level of biomass, tTES , , depends not only upon r, K, q, and fishing effort, Et, but 
now also on ),( Ztte µλ − . With continued technical progress we only have a steady-state equilibrium 
level of biomass if the fishing effort is reduced accordingly. This can be seen by differentiating 
(3) with respect to time (given the level of technical efficiency) to give: 
 )( ),(),(
,
ZtttZtt
t
tTE
e
t
EeEq
r
K
t
S µλµλ λ
∂
∂ −−
∂
∂+−=  .               (4) 
From (4) it is clear that a steady-state equilibrium level of biomass requires 
  
∂Et ∂t = −λEt < 0 . In 
other words if the level of fishing effort is constant, continuous technical progress will lower the 
level of the biomass. In principle, with a pure compensation population model, such as the logistic 
growth function and the static Schaefer model, the population can march inexorably to extinction 
with continued technical progress without corresponding reductions in the level of fishing effort, 
as illustrated by Figure 1 by the continued rotation upwards of the ray from the origin, the 
production frontier from Equation (1).17 
The higher is technical efficiency, the lower is equilibrium level of tTES , :18 
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     0
),(
),(
,
>= − Zttt
tTE
eqE
r
K
Zt
S µλ
∂µ
∂  .    (5) 
This effect is shown in Figure 1 as an upwards shift of the production function. Changes in 
technical efficiency lead to changes in the steady-state equilibrium level of biomass. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
The equilibrium Schaefer yield-effort frontier allowing for technical inefficiency and 
technical change is found by substituting tTES ,  from (3) into the production frontier (1) to give: 
  
YtTE ,t = qKEteλt−µ( t,Z ) 1−
qEteλt−µ(t ,Z )
r
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ = qKEteλt−µ(t ,Z ) −
q2KEt 2e2λt−2µ( t,Z )
r  . (6) 
The marginal product of effort, 
  
MPETE ,t , is reKEqqKeEY ZtttZttttTE ),(222),(, 2 µλµλ∂∂ −− −= . The 
average product of effort is reKEqqKeEYAP Zttt
Ztt
t
tTE
t
tTE
E
),(222),(,, µλµλ −− −==  
[ ]reqEqKe ZtttZtt ),(),( 1 µλµλ −− −= , or using (3), tTEZtttTeE SqeAP ,),(, µλ −= . 
 The level of technical efficiency of the fleet or the state of technical progress does not 
affect maximum sustainable yield (MSY) or the corresponding resource stock level (Figure 1). 
This follows because MSY and the stock level at MSY are solely determined by the biological 
parameters r and K. However, the corresponding level of effort is affected. Differentiating (6) by 
Et and setting the result equal to zero gives the level of fishing effort that produces MSY (Table 
1): 
  
EMSYTE ,t =
r
2qeλt−µ(t ,Z ) . The difference 
  
EMSYTE ,t − EMSY =
r
2q
1
eλt−µ(t ,Z ) −1
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
 indicates that technical 
progress reduces the effort and increases in technical inefficiency raise the effort yielding MSY, 
where 
  
EMSY  is the MSY level of effort in the standard model, i.e. without technical change and 
technical efficiency. Substituting 
  
EMSYTE ,t  into the yield-effort curve (6) gives MSY (Table 1): 
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  
YMSYTE ,t = rK 4 . Similarly, substituting 
  
EMSYTE ,t  into (3) gives 
  
SMSYTE ,t = K 2. The difference 
  
APETE ,t − APE = [ ] [ ]11 ),(222),( +−− −− ztttZtt eKEqeqK µλµλ  similarly indicates that technical progress 
reduces the average product of effort and that increase in technical inefficiency raises it. 
Sustainable yield changes over time as given after differentiating (6) by time t: 
   
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡ −=
−
−
t
Zt
r
eKEq
t
ZteqKE
t
Y ZtttZtt
t
tTE
∂
∂µλ
∂
∂µλ
∂
∂ µλµλ ),(2),(
),(2222
),(
,
   .         (7) 
Technical progress holding technical inefficiency constant is given by: 
        tTEEt
Ztt
tZtt
t
tTE
MPE
r
eqEeqKE
t
Y ,),(),(, 21 λλ
∂
∂ µλµλ =⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−=
−
−    .          (8) 
The sustainable yield is zero when fishing effort exceeds the critical level of effort, 
  
Ec  
(Clark 1976). In the standard equilibrium Schaefer yield-effort model, 
  
Ec = r q; when qrE > , 
the population is driven towards extinction and when 
  
E ≤ r q = Ec, there exists a stable 
equilibrium population level. When output-oriented technical efficiency and technical change are 
introduced into the equilibrium Schaefer yield-effort frontier (6), then
  
EcTE ,t = r qeλt−µ( t,Z )[ ]. The 
difference 
  
EcTE ,t − Ec =
r
q
1
eλt−µ(t ,Z ) −1
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
 indicates that technical progress reduces the critical level of 
effort and technical inefficiency increases the critical level of effort. 
The sign of tY tTE ∂∂ ,  depends on the level of E. Specifically, 0)(
,
<>
t
Y tTE
∂
∂  as 
tTE
MSY
Ztt
t EqerE
,),(2)( =>< −µλ , i.e. technical progress increases (decreases) equilibrium yield 
when tTEMSYt EE
,)(>< . Technical progress raising equilibrium yield requires not only a positive rate 
of output augmentation, 
  
λ > 0, but a positive marginal product of effort, 
  
MPETE ,t > 0, or what is 
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effectively harvesting in the Bioeconomic Stage II of Production where tTEMSYt EE
,0 << .19 
 The marginal product of effort changes over time as given by: 
[ ][ ]reKEqqKetZttEYtMP ZtttZttttTEtTEE ),(222),(,2, 4),( µλµλ∂∂µλ∂∂∂∂∂ −− −−== . Holding 
technical inefficiency constant, technical progress affects 
  
MPETE ,t  as: 
== tEYtMP t
tTE
E
tTE
E ∂∂∂∂∂
,2,  [ ]reKEqqKe ZtttZtt ),(222),( 4 µλµλλ −− −  
[ ]reqKEqKe ZtttZtt ),(),( 41 µλµλλ −− −= . 
  
∂MPETE ,t ∂t > (<)0  when 2)( .tTEMSYt EE >< , as indicated by 
setting the terms inside the bracket equal to zero and solving for E, giving 
24 ,),( tTEMSY
Ztt
tt EeqErE ==
−µλ . Changes in technical inefficiency on 
  
MPETE ,t  holding technical 
progress constant are given by == ),(,2, ZtEYtMP t
tTEtTE
E ∂µ∂∂∂∂  
[ ]reKEqqKetZt ZtttZtt ),(222),( 4),( µλµλ∂∂µ −− −−  [ ]reqKEqKeZt ZtttZtt ),(),( 41),( µλµλµ −− −−= . 
  
∂MPETE ,t ∂µ(t,z)(<)0  as 2)( .tTEMSYt EE >< . Figure 2 illustrates the effect of technical progress on 
  
MPETE ,t . 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 The average product of effort changes over time as given by: 
( )[ ][ ]reKEqqKetZttAP ZtttZtttTEE ),(222),(, 2, µλµλ∂∂µλ∂∂ −− −−= . Holding technical inefficiency 
constant, setting the terms inside the brackets equal, and solving shows that 
  
∂APETE ,t ∂t > (<)0  as 
tTE
MSYt EE
,)(>< . 
The effect of the level of technical inefficiency on sustainable yield depends on the level 
of effort vis-à-vis the MSY level of effort, 
  
EMSYTE ,t , or equivalently, the resource stock vis-à-vis 
MSY, 
  
SMSYTE ,t . Holding technical progress constant, differentiating the equilibrium yield-effort 
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frontier, Equation (6), with respect to
  
µ(t,Z)  gives: 
 ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
+−=
−
−
r
eqEeqKE
Ztd
dY ZtttZtt
t
tTE ),(
),(
, 2
1
),(
µλ
µλ
µ
 .                                   (9) 
The sign of ),(, ZtddY tTE µ  depends on the algebraic sign of [ ]),(2 Zttt eqEr µλ −+−  which 
since 0),( >− Zttt eqKE
µλ , depends on the level of effort E vis-à-vis 
  
EMSYTE ,t . Hence, when 
tTE
MSYZttt Eqe
rE ,),(2
)( =<> −µλ , 0)(),(
, <>ZtddY tTE µ , i.e. when tTEMSYt EE
,)(<>  an increase in 
technical inefficiency or reduction in technical efficiency leads to an increase (decrease) in 
sustainable yield. Similar to technical progress, 
  
∂MPETE ,t ∂µ(t,Z) < (>)0 , as 2)( .tTEMSYt EE >< . 
In short, changes in technical efficiency and technology can raise (lower) sustainable, 
steady-state yield at lower (higher) levels of effort than that of MSY, at which point the resource 
stock is comparatively higher (lower) and the marginal product of effort is positive (negative).20 
These results with a renewable resource and the requirement of sustainable yield sharply contrast 
with the usual expected result in industries that do not exploit a renewable resource with a stock-
flow technology in which an increase in technical efficiency (up to the frontier) and especially 
technology raises output levels regardless of the input levels. This can also been seen in Figure 1. 
If the surplus production frontier crosses the growth function below 
  
SMSY , then increases in effort 
decreases equilibrium yield, while if the surplus production frontier crosses above 
  
SMSY , then 
increases in effort increase equilibrium yield. 
The traditional static results are now conditional upon the level of technical inefficiency 
and the state of technology. Allowing for technical inefficiency and technical progress shows that 
there any number of sustainable equilibria effort, resource stock, and catch levels, and that these 
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sustainable equilibria can readily change over time through technical progress and changes in 
technical efficiency. Increases in technical efficiency and technical progress raise sustainable 
yields at levels of effort below the 
  
EMSYTE ,t , i.e. at a Bioeconomic Stage II of Production, but lower 
sustainable yields at higher effort levels. Increases in technical efficiency and technical progress 
raise 
  
MPETE ,t  at levels of effort one-half of 
  
EMSYTE ,t . In both instances, 
  
EMSYTE ,t  is declining with 
increases in technical efficiency and technical progress and hence the interval of effort within the 
bioeconomic Stage II of Production will continue to decrease. 
4. The Gordon-Schaefer Bioeconomic Model 
Gordon (1954) developed the classic static bioeconomic model based on the equilibrium 
Schaefer yield-effort curve when the access to the fishery is open. Let P = constant price per unit 
of harvested biomass (yield). Let c = constant (marginal and average) cost per unit of effort, 
where allow all costs to be variable in a given time period. Total sustainable revenue (using 
Equation 6) is ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−=
−
−
r
eqEePqKETR
Ztt
tZtt
t
tTE
),(
),(, 1
µλ
µλ . Total cost is commonly specified 
tcETC = , so that the costs of fishing are proportional to the effort expended.  
The rent frontier allowing for technical inefficiency and technical change is: 
     [ ] t
Ztt
tZtt
t
tTEtTEZtt cE
r
eqEePqKETCTReEKqrcP −⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−=−=
−
−−
),(
),(,,),( 1,,,,,,
µλ
µλµλπ          (10) 
   t
Ztt
tZtt
t cEr
eKEPqePqKE −
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−=
−
−
),(2222
),(
µλ
µλ  . 
The marginal revenue of effort from (10) is: 
  
∂TRTE ,t ∂E =MR
E
TE ,t  
[ ] EreKEPqePqKE ZtttZttt ∂∂ µλµλ ),((222),( −− −=  reKEPqPqKe ZtttZtt ),(222),( 2 µλµλ −− −=  = 
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⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−=
−
−
r
eqEPqKe
Ztt
tZtt
),(
),( 21
µλ
µλ . 
  
MR
E
TE ,t > (<)0  depends on tTEMSYt EE ,)(>< . Setting the two terms 
inside the brackets equal to zero and solving for E shows that 
  
MR
E
TE ,t > (<)0  as 
[ ] tTEMSYZttt EqerE ,),(2)( =>< −µλ , that is, within a Bioeconomic Stage II of Production.  
 Technical progress changes 
  
MRETE ,t  by output-augmentation in the production frontier (1), 
and thus the Schaefer yield-effort frontier (6), and is given by: 
 ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡ −=
−
−
r
eqEPqKe
t
Zt
t
MR ZtttZtt
tTE
E
),(
),(
, 4
1),(
µλ
µλ
∂
∂µλ
∂
∂ . 
Setting the terms inside the right-hand bracket equal to zero, holding technical inefficiency 
constant, and solving for 
  
ETE ,t  gives: 
  
ETE ,t = r 4qeλt−µ(t ,Z ) = EMSYTE ,t 2 , where 
  
EMSYTE ,t  corresponds to 
prior technical progress. Hence, since 
  
λPqKeλt−µ(t ,Z ) > (<)0  for technical progress (regress), 
  
∂MRETE ,t ∂t > (<)0  as 
  
ETE ,t < (>)EMSYTE ,t 2 . Technical progress increases 
  
MRETE ,t  over increasingly 
lower levels of effort as time progresses as illustrated in Figure 2, recognizing that 
  
MRETE ,t = PMPETE ,t . 
A different specification of the rent frontier is found by solving the production frontier (1) 
for [ ]),( Zttt qSeYE µλ −= , and substituting into the cost equation tcETC =  to give the cost 
function: 
 [ ] .),(,,,, ),(
t
t
Ztt qS
Y
e
cZtqSYTC µλµλ −=−    
Technical progress leads to cost diminution, where the TC function can now be interpreted in 
terms of input price diminishment or effective input price, given by 
  
c φ(t) , and where 
  
φ(t) = eλt−µ( t,Z ) is the augmentation coefficient.21 With a single composite input, cost-reducing 
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technical change can be viewed as cost-neutral and is equivalent to rent-neutral and Hick’s-
neutral technical change with the homogenous Gordon-Schaefer rent frontier.22   
Technical progress and gains in technical efficiency reduce costs. From 
[ ][ ]tZttttTE qSecYtZTtTC ),(, ),( µλ∂∂µλ∂∂ −−−=  and holding technical inefficiency constant, 
[ ] 0),(, <−= − tZttttTE qSecYtTC µλλ∂∂ , i.e. cost diminution, and holding technical change constant 
gives [ ] 0),( ),(, >= − tZttttTE qSecYtZttTC µλ∂∂µ∂∂ , i.e. increases in technical efficiency also 
diminishes cost. Increases (decreases) in the resource stock lower (raise) total costs, 
[ ] 02),(, <−= − tZttttTE qSecYSTC µλ∂∂ , and decreases in the resource stock combined with 
technical progress raise total costs, [ ] 02),(,2 >= − tZttttTE qSecYtSTC µλλ∂∂∂ , as might be 
expected as technical progress reduces the resource stock, thereby countervailing the effect of 
technical progress on costs.23 Marginal cost is given by [ ]tZtttTEtTEE qSecYTCMC ),(,, µλ∂∂ −== , 
and increases in technology, technical efficiency, and resource stock have the same effect on 
marginal cost as on total cost, i.e. 
  
∂ 2TCTE ,t ∂Y∂t < 0,∂ 2TCTE ,t ∂Y∂µ(t,z) > 0  and 
  
∂ 2TCTE ,t ∂Y∂S < 0. 
The rent frontier using the cost function is written: 
[ ] tZtt
tt
t
Zttt
Ztt Y
eqS
cP
qS
Y
e
cPYeYSqcP ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−=−= −−
−
),(),(
),(,,,,, µλµλ
µλπ .                      (11) 
This rent frontier in terms of yield and biomass is used in several derivations below and in the 
dynamic model. The rent frontier in terms of effort, Equation (10), is useful for empirical analysis 
of time series of catch and effort. 
 Sustainable resource 
  
π TE ,t  rent changes over time in (10) according to: 
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.         (12) 
Holding constant changes in technical inefficiency over time gives the effects of technical 
progress on resource rent:  
 .                  (13) 
Given , the sign of  depends on the sign of , which in turn depends on 
the sign of the terms in the bracket. Setting the terms inside the brackets equal to zero and solving 
gives  or .   when
  
MRETE ,t > (<)0 , which 
occurs when , i.e. when effort falls within the Bioeconomic Stage II of production, 
which also corresponds to .24 We observe in passing that the technical progress 
raises rent (11) through reductions in total costs and that . 
Much traditional regulation limits production or input use and thereby creates technical 
inefficiency. The effect of an increase in technical inefficiency on resource rent is given by: 
   t
tTE
E
Ztt
tZtt
t
tTE
EMRZt
r
eKEPqPqKeEZt
Zt
,
),(222
),(
,
),(
2
),(
),(
µµ
∂µ
∂π µλµλ −=⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−−=
−
−     .            (14) 
The effect of regulation by technical inefficiency is captured by 
  
∂π TE ,t
∂µ(t,Z)
∂µ(t,Z)
∂Z . Similar to 
technical change, given 
  
−µ(t,Z) < 0  and 
  
E > 0, 0)(),(),( ,, ><−= ttTEEtTE EMRZtZt µ∂µ∂π , when 
  
MRETE ,t > (<)0 , which occurs when tTEMSYt EE ,)(>< , which corresponds to MSYt SS )(<>  and the 
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Bioeconomic Stage II of production. 
4.1. The Gordon-Schaefer Model under Open Access 
At the open-access equilibrium, all rents are dissipated, so that 
[ ] 0.,,,,, ),( =− Zttt eEKqrcP µλπ  and the level of effort is larger than Pareto-optimal. Solving for the 
steady-state equilibrium level of biomass under open access, 
  
S
∞
TE ,t , from (11) gives: 
    
  
S
∞
TE ,t = cPqeλt−µ(t ,Z )  .                                                     (15) 
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  
S∞ = c Pq in the standard Gordon model without technical efficiency and the state of 
technology and is constant over time. The level of technical efficiency, the state of 
technology, catchability, and the cost-price ratio determine 
  
S
∞
TE ,t  in (15). The difference 
  
S∞TE ,t − S∞ =
c
Pq
1
eλt−µ( t,Z ) −1
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
 indicates that technical progress and increases in technical 
efficiency reduce
  
S
∞
TE ,t , i.e. 
  
S∞TE ,t < S∞ .   
 Technical progress reduces the steady-state resource stock over all population 
levels with pure compensation models such as the logistic. Differentiating (15) by t gives:  
                    
  
∂S∞TE ,t
∂t =
c
Pqeλt−µ(t ,Z ) −λ +
∂µ(t,Z)
∂t
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
= −S∞TE ,t λ −
∂µ(t,Z)
∂t
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
   .                        
(16) 
Holding technical inefficiency constant shows that continued technical progress leads to 
inexorable decline in the resource stock: 
 
  
∂S∞TE ,t
∂t =
−λc
Pqeλt−µ(t ,Z ) = −λS∞
TE ,t < 0.                                                       
(17) 
The inherent inability of input controls to halt this decline in the face of continued 
technical progress and ill-structured property rights is evident. Technical progress creates 
a paradox, in which gains in private efficiency through process innovations reduce the 
resource stock for all. 
 Regulation by increasing technical inefficiency lifts the open-access equilibrium 
resource stock, demonstrating the paradox. Differentiating (15) by 
  
µ(t,Z)  gives: 
                
  
∂S∞TE ,t
∂µ(t,Z) = µ(t,Z)
c
Pqeλt−µ( t,Z ) = µ(t,Z)S∞
TE ,t > 0  .                            
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(18) 
Because technical efficiency only increases to the best-practice frontier that exists in a 
given time period, there is an inherent limit to the extent that gains in technical efficiency 
can drive down the resource stock. Technical progress is clearly the more powerful force 
for resource stock declines.  
The open-access level of effort, 
  
E∞TE ,t , allowing for technical efficiency, the state 
of technology, and steady-state equilibrium is found by setting 
  
π = 0 in (10) to give: 
                            
  
E
∞
TE ,t = rqeλt−µ( t,Z ) 1−
c
PKqeλt−µ(t ,Z )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
= r PqKe
2λt−2µ( t,Z ) − c
Pq2Ke2λt−2µ( t,Z )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥                          
(19a) 
                                     
  
= rqeλt−µ(t ,Z ) 1−
S∞TE ,t
K
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ = 2EMSYTE ,t 1−
S∞TE ,t
K
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥   .                                          
(19b) 
In the standard model 
  
E∞ = r
PqK − c
Pq2K
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
].1[
pqK
c
q
r −=  and the difference is 
  
E∞TE ,t − E∞ =
r
Pq2K PqK + c[ ]
1
eλt−µ(t ,Z ) −1
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
. ∞∞ >< EE
tTE )(,  depending on the relative 
strengths of technical progress and technical inefficiency, but where 
  
E∞TE ,t < E∞  with 
technical progress and increases in technical efficiency. 
Changes in technology and technical efficiency alter 
  
E∞TE ,t . Differentiating (19a) 
by t: 
   
  
∂E∞TE ,t
∂t =
r
qeλt−µ( t,Z ) 1−
2c
PqKeλt−µ(t ,Z )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
−λ + ∂µ(t,Z)
∂t
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
= − rqeλt−µ( t,Z ) 1−
S∞TE ,t
K 2
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ λ −
∂µ(t,Z)
∂t
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
.    
(20) 
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Holding technical inefficiency constant, (20) reduces to the effects of technical progress 
on 
  
E∞TE ,t : 
       
  
∂E∞TE ,t
∂t = −
λr
qeλt−µ( t,Z ) 1−
2c
PqKeλt−µ(t ,Z )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
= − λrqeλt−µ(t ,Z ) 1−
S∞TE ,t
K 2
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ = −λEMSYTE ,t 1−
S∞TE ,t
SMSY
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ .          
(21) 
The effect of technical progress on tTEE ,∞ depends on the level of 
  
S∞TE ,t  relative to 
  
SMSY = SMSYTE ,t = K 2 , because 
  
−λr qeλt−µ(t ,Z ) = −λ2EMSYTE ,t < 0.  Setting the terms inside of the 
brackets equal to zero and solving gives
  
S∞TE ,t = K 2 = SMSY ,  so that 
  
∂E∞TE ,t ∂t < (>)0 as 
  
S∞TE ,t < (>)SMSY . Technical progress lowers (raises) effort in open access if the open access 
resource stock is less (greater) than the MSY stock level. The resource stock under open 
access can generally be expected to lie below 
  
SMSY , so that technical progress can be 
expected to lower effort. 
 Figure 3 illustrates the effect of technical progress on the sustainable revenue 
frontier, total costs, and effort. Technical progress shifts the revenue frontier toward the 
origin and reduces the open-access level of effort.  
[Figure 3 around here] 
The effects of changes in technical inefficiency on
  
E∞TE ,t  depend on the level of 
  
S∞TE ,t  relative to 
  
SMSY . Differentiating (19b) by 
  
µ(t,Z)  gives:  
      
  
∂E∞TE ,t
∂µ(t,Z) =
µ(t,Z)r
qeλt−µ(t ,Z ) 1−
S∞TE ,t
K 2
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ = µ(t,Z) EMSY
TE
2 1−
S∞TE ,t
SMSY
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ .                                     
(22) 
  
µ(t,Z)r qeλt−µ(t ,Z ) > 0. Setting the terms inside of the brackets equal to zero and solving  
gives
  
S∞TE ,t = K 2 = SMSY , the resource stock level at which 
  
E∞TE ,t = EMSY  also occurs, so 
 
 21 
that: 
  
∂E∞TE ,t ∂µ(t,Z) > (<)0 as 
  
S∞TE ,t < (>)SMSY .  
In short, gains in private technical efficiency and technical progress pose a social 
problem with open access or unregulated common property through short run rises in 
catch rates, increases in effort, a new Pareto-inefficient equilibrium, and further 
reductions of the resource stock (which is socially undesirable if this level is less than the 
target). These gains in private technical efficiency and technical progress raise social 
costs as the technological resource stock externality is exacerbated, as is demonstrated 
next. 
4.2. The Resource Stock Externality under Open Access 
 The effect of technical inefficiency and technical progress on the technological 
resource stock externality under open access can be examined with a simple static model 
adapted from Hartwick and Olewiler (1998). Letting 
  
P =1, the average revenue of effort 
  
(ARETE ,t ) equals the average product of effort 
  
(APETE ,t )and 
  
MRETE ,t = MPETE ,t . The total 
harvest from the fishery is t
tTE
E
tTE
E EAPY
,, = . Differentiating t
tTE
E
tTE
E EAPY
,, =  with 
respect to E gives: 
dE
dAPEAP
dE
dYMP
tTE
E
t
tTE
E
tTE
EtTE
E
,
,
,
, +== , where 
dE
dAPE
tTE
E
t
,
 is the stock 
effect or the technological stock externality. 
 The stock effect is negative, 0
),(222
,, <−=−
−
r
eKEq
APMP
Ztt
ttTE
E
tTE
E
µλ
, because 
an increase in E reduces the sustainable resource stock, which in turn lowers the catch per 
unit of effort, 
  
APETE ,t . For each increment in E, firms actually receive the industry 
  
AP
E
TE ,t  
minus the stock effect, which no firm considers. All firms in the industry are affected by 
the marginal change in E, but because the effect per firm is relatively small, each firm 
ignores it.  
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 The size of the externality depends upon the level of effort and the state of 
technology and technical efficiency. The stock externality changes over time according 
to: 
[ ]
⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡ −
−
=⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−=
− −−
t
Zt
r
eKEq
r
eKEq
tt
APMP Zttt
Ztt
t
tTE
E
tTE
E
∂
∂µλ
∂
∂
∂
∂ µλµλ ),(2 ),(222),(222,,    .      
(23) 
Holding technical inefficiency constant, 
  
∂ MPETE ,t − APETE ,t[ ] ∂t  gives the impact of 
technical progress on the stock externality. Because [ ] 02 ),(222 <− − reKEq Zttt µλλ , 
technical progress deepens the stock externality, widening the wedge between the private 
and social costs. Even though the technical progress exacerbates the stock externality, 
adversely impacting all firms in the fishery and indeed society as a whole, each firm 
ignores this growing adverse marginal impact because the effect per firm is small and 
because the firm instead receives the average product less the small stock effect. 
 The effect of a change in technical efficiency on the stock externality is: 
[ ]
0
2
),(),(
),(222),(222,,
<
−
=⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
=
−
− −−
r
eKEq
r
eKEq
ZtZt
APMP Zttt
Ztt
t
tTE
E
tTE
E
µλµλ
µ∂
∂
µ∂
∂  .                
(24) 
Declines in technical inefficiency through time similarly exacerbate the stock externality. 
5. The Static Pareto Optimum: The Sole Owner 
The “sole owner” provides the standard static Pareto-optimum benchmark to the 
inefficient open-access equilibrium (Scott 1955). The sole owner might be an individual 
firm or public agency maximizing social welfare. The Pareto optimum is now comprised 
of both scale and technical efficiency and is conditional upon the state of technology. The 
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static rent-maximizing sole owner with output-oriented technical inefficiency and 
technical progress maximizes the rent frontier 
[ ] [ ] ttt cEtqrEPYtqrEcP −= µµπ ,,,,,,,,,, , Equation (10).25 The first-order condition for 
rent maximization and a Pareto optimum is:26 
      0
2 ),(222),(, =−−=
−
− c
r
eKEPq
PqKe
E
Ztt
tZtt
tTE µλ
µλ
∂
∂π  .                                       
(25) 
Scale efficiency, given technical inefficiency and the state of technology, occurs when 
  
MRETE ,t = MCE , i.e. cr
eKEPqPqKe
Ztt
tZtt =−
−
−
),(222
),( 2
µλ
µλ , 
where the Pareto optimum requires full technical efficiency. 
 The level of fishing effort giving scale efficiency with technical progress and 
technical inefficiency is: 
  
  
E*TE ,t =
r PqKeλt−µ(t ,Z ) − c[ ]
2Pq2Ke2λt−2µ( t,Z ) =
r
2qeλt−µ( t,Z ) 1−
S
∞
TE ,t
K
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ = EMSYTE ,t 1−
S∞TE ,t
K
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥  .                
(26) 
As with the standard sole owner model, and comparing (19b) with (26), 
  
E*TE ,t = E∞TE ,t /2, 
but the technical inefficiency leads to lower levels of both open-access equilibrium and 
optimal level of effort than under full technical efficiency. That is, the efficient scale of 
production for the aggregate technology requires lower effort. Figure 3 illustrates the 
optimal effort prior to technical progress, 
  
E* , and the reduction in optimal effort from 
technical progress, tTEE ,* . 
 In the standard model, 
  
E* = r PqK − c[ ] 2Pq2K , and the difference is 
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  
E*TE ,t − E* =
r PqKeλt−µ(t ,Z ) − c[ ]
2Pq2Ke2λt−2µ( t,Z ) −
r PqK − c[ ]
2Pq2K =
r
2Pq2K PqK + c[ ]
1
eλt−µ(t ,Z ) −1
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
. 
  
E*TE ,t < (>)E*, depending on the relative strengths of technical progress and technical 
inefficiency, but with technical progress and increases in technical efficiency
  
E*TE ,t < E* . 
 The effects of changes in technology and technical inefficiency on the Pareto-
optimum level of effort are the same as on the open-access level of effort, since 
  
E*TE ,t = E∞TE ,t /2 , i.e. since 
  
E*TE ,t  is simply a scalar multiple of 
  
E∞TE ,t , see Equation 20. 
Thus, ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−−== ∞∞
MSY
tTE
tTE
MSY
tTEtTE
S
SE
t
E
t
E ,,,,* 1
2
12/ λ
∂
∂
∂
∂  and the same conclusions hold as with 
  
∂E∞TE ,t ∂t . 
 The static scale-efficient level of the resource stock 
  
S*TE ,t is: 
     
  
S*TE ,t = K −
K
2 1−
c
PqKeλt−µ( t,Z )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
= 12 K + S∞
TE ,t[ ]  ,                                   
(27) 
where the Pareto optimum requires full technical efficiency. 
 The level of carrying capacity, technical efficiency, the state of technology, 
catchability, and the cost-price ratio determine tTES ,*  in (27). It follows from equation 
(27) that the sole owner resource stock is larger than the open-access resource stock, i.e. 
  
S*TE ,t > S∞TE ,t . The optimal stock level in the standard model is )1(2* pqK
cKS +=  and the 
difference ⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡ −=− − 1
1
),(*
,
* Ztt
tTE
ePq
cSS µλ  indicates that technical progress and increases 
in technical efficiency reduce tTES ,* , i.e. *
,
* SS
tTE < .   
 The Pareto-optimal stock
  
S*TE ,t  changes over time according to: 
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  
∂S*TE ,t
∂t =
∂
∂t
1
2 K + S∞
TE ,t[ ] = ∂ S∞
TE ,t 2[ ]
∂t =
∂
∂t
c
2Pqeλt−µ(t ,Z )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
= − λ − ∂µ(t,Z)
∂t
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
S∞TE ,t
2   .      
(28)  
Holding technical inefficiency constant, technical progress lowers 
  
S*TE ,t : 
             
  
∂S*TE ,t
∂t = −λ
S∞TE ,t
2 < 0    .                                                        
(29) 
Increases in technical inefficiency given technology raise
  
S*TE ,t : 
             ( ) ( ) 02,,
,,
* >= ∞
tTEtTE SZt
Zt
S µ
∂µ
∂ ,                                                 
(30) 
which reaches the scale- and technically efficient optimum when TE=1. 
Under open access, the regulator may invoke the policy variables Ψ to induce 
technical inefficiency and thereby guide fishing effort to that level giving 
  
E *.  Rent 
dissipation and Pareto-inefficiency with a Nash equilibrium remain since open access 
remains. Letting Z = Ψ, then  
  
µ = g t,ψ,Eψ( ) . When regulators manage the fishery by 
inducing technical inefficiency, it is expected that 
  
∂µ ∂ψ > 0 , that is, an increase in the 
strength of the policy (e.g. shorter seasons) induces increased technical inefficiency or 
reduced technical efficiency. 
The static rent-maximizing yield conditional upon technology and technical 
inefficiency, tTEY ,* , can be found from: 
),(,
*
,
*
,
*
ZtttTEtTEtTE eEqSY µλ −= .  Substituting in the 
values for tTEE ,*  and 
tTES ,*  found above gives 
tTEY ,* : 
))(1(
4
2
),(
,
* ztt
tTE
pqKe
crKY µλ −−=                
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(31) 
Whether the rent-maximizing level of yield is higher than the optimal yield in the 
standard model depends as before on the relative strengths of technical progress and 
technical inefficiency, but with technical progress and increases in technical 
efficiency *
,
* YY
tTE > . 
The rent-maximizing yield changes over time: 
2
),(
,
* )(
2
)),(( ztt
tTE
pqKe
crK
t
zt
t
Y
µλ
µλ −∂
∂−=
∂
∂  
Holding technical inefficiency constant, technical progress always increases rent-
maximizing yield, while increases in technical inefficiency given technology always 
decreases rent-maximizing yield. These results are due to the fact that the level of optimal 
stock will always be higher than the MSY-stock level. 
 These results show that if the fishery policy is based on economic efficiency (e.g. 
ITQs) then technical progress and overall higher technical efficiency provides a positive 
net-benefit from a social point of view. The adjustments in effort are under ITQs handled 
by the private actors in the fishery while the setting of the TAC is the responsibility of the 
regulators. Setting the right TAC requires following equation (31), knowledge about the 
biological parameters r and K and the economic parameters price/cost relationships, 
catchability, technical progress and technical inefficiency. 
6. The Backward-Bending Supply Curve with Technical Inefficiency and Technical 
Change 
 Equilibrium supply represents the yield from the fishery as a function of the 
prices of catch and effort and biological parameters under conditions of steady-state 
equilibrium. To find the static equilibrium supply curve allowing for technical 
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inefficiency, substitute 
  
S
∞
TE ,t  from (15) into the condition for steady-state equilibrium, 
  
Y = F(S), to give: 
        ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−= −− ),(),(
, 1 zttztt
tTE
PqKe
c
Pqe
rcY µλµλ       .                                           
(32) 
Because [ ][ ][ ]tZtPqKecPqerctY ZttZtttTE ∂∂−−=∂∂ −− ),(21 ),(),(, µλµλµλ  = 
[ ] [ ][ ]tTEMSYtTEMSYZtt EPKcPEKe ,,),( 412 −−µλλ , technical progress and gains in technical 
efficiency raise (lower) sustainable supply when cPKE tTEMSY 4)(
, >< . The vertical 
intercept of the static sustainable supply curve becomes: 
      
  
PTE ,t = cKqeλt−µ( t,Z )  .        (33) 
Technical progress and gains in technical efficiency lower this intercept. The slope now 
depends on the states of technology and technical inefficiency: 
    
  
∂YTE ,t
∂P =
rc
P 2qeλt−µ( t,Z ) −1+
2c
PKqeλt−µ( t,Z )
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
 .                                          
(34) 
Price at maximum sustainable yield,
  
PMSYTE ,t , now also depends on the states of technology 
and technical inefficiency: 
     
  
PMSYTE ,t =
2c
Kqeλt−µ( t,Z )  .                           
(35) 
Because [ ] ( )[ ]tZtKectP ZtttTEMSY ∂∂−−=∂∂ − ,2 ),(, µλµλ , both technical progress and gains 
in technical efficiency lower price at MSY. Maximum static sustainable supply is found 
by substituting (35) into (32) to give: 
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  
YMSYTE ,t =
rc
PMSYTE ,tqeλt−µ(t ,Z )
1− cPMSYTE ,tKqeλt−µ( t,Z )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ =
rK
4 .   (36) 
As before, MSY is unchanged by technical progress or technical inefficiency, since it is 
established by the biological conditions. 
7. Dynamic Model 
 The presence of technical inefficiency and technical progress substantially 
changes the standard normative results through an augmented Golden Rule or 
fundamental equation of renewable resource exploitation. We demonstrate this result by a 
simple model of present value maximization of net benefits for a sole owner or social 
planner derived from exploiting the resource, but in which technical progress and 
technical inefficiency are now allowed.27 The cost diminution in our cost-neutral cost 
frontier and rent-neutral rent frontier exactly measures technical progress because of the 
linear homogeneity in E, without confounding by economies or diseconomies of scale. 
This linear homogeneity in E also yields costs linear in the control variable Y. The 
introduction of changes in technology and technical efficiency, however, creates an 
optimization model that while linear in Y with linear bang-bang approach paths to the 
steady-state equilibrium resource stock when technology and technical efficiency are 
static, creates approach paths to the infinite time horizon stock that are now nonlinear. 
 If 
  
δ > 0  is a constant denoting the continuous social rate of discount, the objective 
may be expressed as: 
  
PV (π ) = π Yt ,St[ ]0
∞∫ e−δtdt  subject to tt YSFdtdS −= )(  and 
  
S0 = S 0( ) , where 
[ ] tZtt
t
Ztt
t
t
t
Ztt
tt YeqS
cP
eqS
YcPYeYSqcP ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−=−= −−
−
)),((),(
),(,,,,, µλµλ
µλπ  from Equation 
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(11). The inclusion of time leads to a non-autonomous model.  
 The present value Hamiltonian allowing for technical inefficiency and technical 
progress is given by: 
          
  
H = e−δtπ Yt ,St[ ] +α(t)(F(St ) −Yt ) = e−δt (P −
c
qSe(λt−µ(t ,z)) )Yt +α(t)(F(St ) −Yt ),           
(37)  
where α(t) is the present value multiplier. The first-order conditions for a maximum are:  
   
  
∂H
∂Yt
= e−∂t ∂π
∂Yt
−α(t) = e−∂t (P − cqSteλt−µ(t ,z)
) −α(t) = 0                                     
(38) 
   
  
∂H
∂St
= e−∂t ∂π
∂St
+α(t) ∂F
∂St
= e−∂t cqSt 2eλt−µ(t ,z)
Y +α(t) ∂F
∂St
= −α(t)
•
 .  (39) 
Taking the time derivative of Equation (38) gives:  
   
•
−
•
−
∂−
−
∂− =−++−− )())),((()()( ),(),(2),( teqS
c
t
ztS
eqS
ce
eqS
cPe ztt
t
tztt
t
t
ztt
t
t α
∂
∂µλδ µλµλµλ .       
(40) 
Equating the right-hand sides of Equations (39) and (40) and simplifying gives an 
augmented Golden Rule, or fundamental equation of renewable resources, incorporating 
technical change and technical inefficiency:  
    
  
∂F
∂St
+ c F(S)S(PqSeλt−µ( t,z ) − c) +
c(λ − ∂µ(t,z) /∂t)
(PqSeλt−µ(t ,z) − c) = δ
    .           (41) 
Compared to the traditional rule, there is a new term added beyond the marginal 
productivity of the resource (
  
∂F ∂St = r 1− 2S K( )), and the marginal stock effect 
  
cF S( )[ ] S(PqSeλt−µ( t,z ) − c)[ ] , namely the last term on the left-hand side, the marginal 
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technology effect. The marginal technology effect captures the effect of technical 
progress and increases in technical efficiency on cost. Furthermore, the marginal stock 
effect is itself augmented by technical change and technical inefficiency. 
 The singular solution *tS  of (41) is (for the logistic growth function): 
       
  
St* =
K
4
c
PqKeλt−µ( t,Z ) +1−
δ
r
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
+ cPqKeλt−µ( t,Z ) +1−
δ
r
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
2
+
8c(δ + λ −∂µ t,Z( ) ∂t)
PqKreλt−µ( t,Z )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
 .         
(42) 
Equation (42) clearly indicates that there is no steady-state solution to the problem. With 
on-going technical change, the optimal level of the stock declines over time, because 
  
PqKeλt−µ( t,z ) increases due to technical progress. However, the short-run effects of 
introducing technical progress are an increase in the stock size. The new marginal 
technology effect term is positive with technical progress, so that – all things equal – the 
stock level is higher compared to the situation without technical progress beyond the 
marginal stock effect. It can also been seen from the last term in (42). In the traditional 
model λ is not included, and therefore the immediate effect of technical progress is a 
higher stock level compared to the traditional model. It is now profitable to reduce 
harvest today because of future technical progress. 
 However, over time technical progress will lead to lower stock levels, because the 
unit profit of harvest, 
  
pqSeλt−µ(t ,z) − c , increases due to technical progress, so that the 
effect of these terms decline over time.28 Notably, the marginal stock effect in the 
modified Golden Rule, Equation (41), declines in importance under continued technical 
progress. Harvest costs that increase with declining stock size can be more than balanced 
by harvest cost diminution through technical progress.29 Over time, the marginal stock 
 
 31 
and technology effects decline, requiring continuing increases in the own rate of return to 
the resource stock, 
  
∂F ∂St , that follow with declining stock size, given constant 
  
δ . The 
own rate of return is increasingly likely to be positive rather than negative as well. Higher 
social discount rates or rates of technical progress hasten the stock decline.   
 A comparison of the marginal stock and technology effects shows that 
  
cF S( )[ ] S(PqSeλt−µ( t,z ) − c)[ ] > (<) c λ −∂µ t,z( ) ∂t( )[ ] (PqSeλt−µ( t,z ) − c)  as 
  
F S( ) S( ) > <( ) λ −∂µ t,z( ) ∂t( ), or in words the marginal stock effect exceeds (falls short 
of) the marginal technology effect when the relative growth of the resource stock exceeds 
(falls short of) the rate of change in technology and technical efficiency. With the logistic 
growth function this is ( ) ( ) ( )( )tztKSr ∂∂µλ ,1 −<>− , so that higher r or K or lower S 
balance higher λ. Notably, as stock levels decline over time in the face of technical 
progress, the marginal costs rise to increasingly counterbalance a constant rate of 
technical progress. With variable rates of technical change, including technical regress, 
this relationship becomes more complex. The marginal stock effect is comparatively 
more important in the modified Golden Rule for relatively lower rates of technical 
progress. 
 The effect of increases in technical efficiency on 
  
St*  for a given state of 
technology, i.e. no further technical progress, eventually ends if the frontier defined by 
current technology is reached. This is the case after full diffusion of a technology or 
fishing skill. 
 The terms involving 
  
PqKeλt−µ( t,z ) in (42) approach 0 in the limit as t approaches 
infinity:  
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⎥
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⎤
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⎣
⎡
⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡ −+⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡ −=∞→
2
* 11
4
lim
rr
KStt
δδ ,                                       
(43) 
It can be seen that MSYtt SS ≤∞→
*lim , because the sum of the terms in the brackets is less 
than or equal to 2, which contrasts with results showing that 
  
S* , the economic optimum 
under static technology, generally exceeds 
  
SMSY  (Grafton et al. 2007).30 Essentially, over 
an infinite time horizon technical progress erodes costs to zero and the optimum stock is 
determined solely by the social discount rate and biological parameters. In the static case, 
where 
  
δ = 0 , 
  
limt→∞ St* = K 2 = SMSY  under continuous technical progress over a long time 
frame (because costs eventually approach 0); this gives an optimal harvest rate of MSY, 
which is the standard biological case without costs and prices. When 
  
δ ≥ r, 
  
limt→∞ St* = 0 
or extinction is optimal under continuous technical progress, where technical progress 
should hasten extinction compared to the case without it. In the intermediate and realistic 
case, 
  
0 < δ < r , and 
  
0 < limt→∞ St* < SMSY , which contrast with the traditional dynamic 
model without technical progress, in which
  
St* > SMSY  for most reasonable levels of costs 
and in which stock-dependent costs play a more important role. The optimal stock size 
given by (43) is exactly the same as the stock size in which the growth rate in the stock is 
equal to the discount rate, i.e. δ=)(' SF , from equation (41).31 
 Differentiating the singular solution 
  
St* , Equation (42), with respect to time gives: 
      
  
∂St*
∂t = − λ −∂µ t,Z( ) ∂t[ ]A(t)
K
4 C t( )   ,                                                  
(44) 
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where 
  
A(t) = c PqKeλt−µ(t ,Z ) , 
  
C t( ) = 1+ 12 B(t)
−12 2 A(t) +1− δr
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
+ 8 δ + λ −∂µ t,Z( ) ∂t[ ]⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ ,  
and 
  
B(t)  is the terms inside of the square root in Equation (42). When technical 
inefficiency is constant, then 
  
∂St* ∂t < 0 , i.e. the resource stock declines with technical 
progress. However, the rate of decline slows, i.e. 
  
∂ 2St* ∂t 2 > 0 , as shown by: 
              ( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡ −=
t
tCtCKtA
t
St
∂
∂λλ
∂
∂
4
)(2
*2
 ,                                        
(45) 
where  )()( tA
t
tA λ
∂
∂ −= and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2
1
2
3
)(812
4
1 −− −⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡ ++⎟
⎠
⎞⎜
⎝
⎛ −+−= tBtAr
r
tAtB
t
tC λδδ
∂
∂ . 
 The declining stock levels out for a given rate of continuous technical progress 
and technical inefficiency over an infinite time horizon. Hence with continuous technical 
progress the optimal stock declines at a slower rate towards a stock level for which the 
growth rate in the stock is equal to the discount rate, i.e. δ=)(' SF . 
 The singular solution for yield 
  
Yt* can be found from the growth equation as 
  
Yt* = F(St*) −
∂St*
∂t . Differentiating yield with respect to time gives: 
   
  
∂Yt*
∂t = r
∂S*
∂t (1−
St*
SMSY
) − ∂
2St*
∂t 2 = −λA(t)
K
4 C(t) r 1−
St*
SMSY
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ + λ
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ .                  
(46) 
The sign of 
  
∂Yt* ∂t  can be either negative or positive depending on the optimal stock 
size. For a given stock level greater than MSYS , the sign of 
  
∂Yt* ∂t  is positive. For stock 
levels lower than the given stock level, the sign is negative, and the optimal yield will 
from a given point in time will decline. In more detail, if 
  
St* < SMSY  the sign of the sum of 
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the terms in the brackets is positive and together with the negative sign of the term 
outside the brackets it results in 
  
∂Yt* ∂t < 0 . If 
  
St* > SMSY , the sign of the sum of the terms 
depends on the relative size between
  
St* SMSY  and the rate of technical progress. The sign 
of 
  
∂Yt* ∂t  is positive for sufficiently high stock levels. For a given stock level higher than 
MSY, 
  
∂Yt* ∂t  is zero. In contrast to the traditional dynamic model, 
  
Yt* is now conditional 
upon the state of technical progress and technical inefficiency as well as the entire set of 
bioeconomic parameters.  
[Figure 4 about here]  
 Figure 4 illustrates examples of paths for the optimal yield. The path beginning in 
Y1 – a high yield level - is declining over time and hence the optimal stock level at the 
initial time is less than the stock level, where 
  
∂Yt* ∂t  is zero. The path beginning in Y2 is 
first increasing indicating that the initial optimal stock level is above the stock level, 
where 
  
∂Yt* ∂t  is zero. Since the optimal stock level decreases, the yield will inevitably 
begin to fall. Finally, the path beginning in Y3 has an even higher initial optimal stock 
level, so that the period with increasing yield is longer. To sum up, the optimal yield path 
is more complicated than the constant equilibrium path obtained in the traditional 
dynamic model.32 The time period with the complicated course is followed by a period 
where the yield path asymptotically approaches the level, where δ=∞ )(' SF , given by 
)1)(1(
2 rr
rKY δδ +−=∞ .33 
 The singular solution for *tE is found from the production frontier as: 
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(47) 
The sign of the time derivative of effort,
  
∂Et* ∂t , can be shown to be negative (positive) 
below (above) a certain level of the stock which is higher than MSYS . Hence, given high 
initial optimal stock levels, in the short and medium run the optimal effort level increases, 
but over time with technical progress the optimal level of effort starts to decline, because 
the optimal stock level declines. Similarly, for stock levels below the stock level, where 
* 0tE t∂∂ = , gains in technical efficiency for a given state of technology lower 
  
Et* until 
the frontier is reached. 
7.1. Biased Technical Change 
 Technical change can be biased towards using more or less effort or the resource 
stock, in which the direction of bias can be induced by the state of property rights (Smith 
1972, Ruttan 2001). Resource-using technical change in a stock-flow production process 
can be viewed as allowing more effective use of the entire, existing resource stock (not 
increasing the overall stock size or giving more catch biomass from the existing stock 
biomass), such as allowing exploitation of formerly unreachable and unfished fishing 
grounds, harvesting of previously undersized fish, or detection of formerly unknown 
stocks (much like increasing the economic reserves of an exhaustible resource). 
Specifying autonomous technical change as input-augmenting by the use of efficiency 
units for both effort and the resource stock with the Schaefer (or Cobb Douglas) 
production function does not allow identifying the individual efficiency gains for effort 
and stock. Thus, ( ) ( ) ( ) βαβλαλβαβλαλβλαλ tttttttttttt SEqeSEeqeSeEeqY 212121 +=== , where  
  
α = β =1 for the Schaefer model. An alternative allowing identification of technical 
change is a modified Cobb-Douglas functional form:  
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  
Yt = qEtβ1 +λ3tStβ 2 +λ4 teλ1t+λ2t
2
,                                              
(48) 
where 
  
β1 = β2 =1 with the Schaefer model. In log-linear form, 
  
lnYt = lnq + β1 lnEt + β2 lnSt + λ1t + λ2t 2 + λ3 lnEtt + λ4 lnStt  and 
  
∂ lnYt ∂t = λ1 + λ2t + λ3 lnEt + λ4 lnSt , where 
  
λ3 > <( )0  indicates technological change 
that is effort using (saving) and 
  
λ4 > <( )0  indicates resource using (saving).  
8. Renewable Resource Policy 
 Consider next the use of taxes to induce the social optimum when there is 
technical progress and initially open access. Under open access, fisher behavior leads to 
the open-access equilibrium with dissipated rents (Gordon 1954). From the rent frontier 
in Equation (11) under open access, price is equal to unit cost, i.e. ( )[ ]tZtt SqecP ,µλ −= . 
From the first-order conditions for the Pareto optimum with the dynamic model given in 
Equation (38),     
     )()(),( tteeqS
cP tztt
t
βαδµλ ==− − ,                                              
(49) 
where 
  
β(t) is the current value costate variable or the marginal user cost, which now 
varies over time with the state of technology and technical efficiency. To align the private 
incentives with the optimal solution a tax equal to 
  
β(t) can be implemented. Because the 
proportional rate of change in optimal stock with respect to time is numerically less than 
the rate of technical progress, the unit cost decreases over time.34 Hence, with constant 
biological and economical parameters the tax rate will increases over time. However, 
from a practical viewpoint, the regulator has to recalculate the tax rate every year, 
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because, without steady-state equilibrium, the optimal level of stock and yield is 
changing due to technical progress. Rates of technical change that vary by time period or 
even regress further complicate the setting of taxes. Further, in the traditional dynamic 
model the tax rate has to be adjusted every year as economic and biologic parameters 
change, making the use of tax policy difficult in practice. The analysis shows that adding 
technical progress and technical inefficiency into the bioeconomic model makes it even 
more complicated to set the optimal tax rate. 
 The shadow price of natural capital or the common renewable resource stock, 
Equation (38), reflects direct use value, representing the marginal user cost along the 
optimal trajectory of the resource in the face of technical progress and changes in 
technical efficiency. This equation does not include the indirect use values from the 
public goods of the broader ecosystem and its services in which the resource stock is 
embedded and makes a contribution as a predator or prey or the indirect use and 
existence value of the stock’s biodiversity. When only capturing direct use value, the 
shadow price can be expected to grow over time under technical progress, but as stock 
levels reach lower levels and the opportunity cost of its increasingly foregone public 
good contributions rises, the net value of the stock will decline, although this value is not 
captured by the fundamental equation of renewable resources or its modification in 
Equation (41). 
 Under ITQ regulation, the regulator has to adjust the total quota so that the 
equilibrium price in the quota market equals the shadow value of the stock. In principle, 
this requires exactly the same information as the tax policy.35 However, the division of 
work has been that the biologist sets a total quota based on biological criteria and the 
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fishermen adjusts their fishing costs by quota trading, leading to a cost-efficient fleet. The 
setting of total quotas is not based on the outcome of a dynamic fishery model. Under 
ITQ regulation, the TAC has to be recalculated on an on-going basis to account for 
technical progress (Murray 2007). Critically, the optimum fleet size and fishing capacity 
must adapt to the TAC of an optimum resource stock that declines over a range before 
reaching a limit as in Equation (43), and which is below that of a steady-state equilibrium 
not accounting for changes in technical inefficiency and technology, given by the 
augmented Golden Rule with the technology term. Empirical experience bears this out in 
the Southeast Trawl fishery of Australia, where a fisheries buyback was required to 
remove excess capacity even after an ITQ program was introduced (Fox et al. 2007). The 
point is that excess capacity can be expected to persist for even long periods of time after 
an ITQ is introduced and other measures may be required to reduce excess capacity 
(Vestergaard et.al. 2005). To sum up, under ITQs a well-functioning quota market is 
needed to achieve a cost-efficient fleet. This point is reinforced by introducing technical 
progress. Further, the setting of the total quota is more complicated with technical 
progress, but in practice this might not influence the quota policy, because in many cases 
the quota is determined only by biological considerations (Squires et.al. 1995).  
9. Empirical Example: The U.S.-Canada Albacore Fleet 
The empirical example applies the concepts of output-oriented technical 
efficiency and technical change to the single-species U.S. and Canadian troll fleets 
fishing for North Pacific albacore (Thunnus alalunga) over 1981-2006 to examine the 
optimal stock, yield, and tax time paths. The case study examines both constant and time-
varying rates of technical progress to demonstrate the additional complexity introduced 
 
 39 
into the modified Golden Rule and optimal exploitation when more realistic 
specifications of technical change are allowed. The data used are for the U.S. and 
Canadian troll fleets, but the bioeconomic results obtained in the simulation should 
closely match the bioeconomics for the entire North Pacific albacore fishery of troll, 
pole-and-line, and other surface gear for Taiwan, Japan, Korea, U.S., and Mexico, since 
catch per unit effort indices for these other surface fisheries closely track those of the 
U.S. and Canadian troll fishery. The industry was not regulated over the period of study, 
implying no regulatory-induced technical change. 
The U.S. and Canadian albacore troll fleets are comprised of family-owned 
vessels harvesting northern albacore from about 150°Ε eastward. The albacore, aged 
about 2-5 years (but predominately ages 3 and 4), are sexually immature, school and 
swim near the ocean surface, and are caught by troll lines employing jigs. During April-
May, distant-water troll vessels begin fishing albacore in the central Pacific Ocean 
(around the International Date Line). As the fish become available off the North 
American coast in June and early July, the distant-water fleet moves closer to the coast 
and coastal vessels enter the fishery. The U.S. and Canadian vessels have access to each 
other’s waters and ports through an international treaty, with Canadian vessels harvesting 
in U.S. waters on a frequent basis due to a preponderance of fish there. The fishery 
utilizes relatively small vessels, with the U.S. vessels averaging 43 feet in length. The 
average year of construction of 1976 suggests a fleet with vessels that are relatively old 
and stable. The average U.S. skipper has 28.9 years of fishing experience, 21.1 years of 
albacore troll experience, and has been with the vessel an average of almost 14 years 
(Squires et al.  2003).  The fishery is largely well established and “mom-and-pop”, with 
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innovation adoption only incompletely diffused and varying by innovation. The 
electronic process innovations used by the U.S. fleet in 1999 include (percent adopters in 
parenthesis): depth sounders (43% ), radar sensor (71%), temperature gauges (54%), telex 
(17%), fax (29%), cell phone (51%), satellite phone (6%), video plotters (9%), direction 
finders (6%), GPS (71%), sideband radio (75%), ham radios (31%), VHF (57%), comsat 
satellite navigation (0%), Doppler radar (0%), autopilot (78%), PC or laptop (57%), sonar 
(20%), color sounder (6%), and IMARSAT (23%). The mean value ($2001) of these 
innovations per vessel over 1996-1999 was $287, compared to a mean insured 
replacement value of the vessel of $365,758.  
The empirical analysis employs the catch and days fished data used in the 
international stock assessments by the population biologists of the fishery’s 
representative countries (McDaniel, Crone, and Dorval 2006). These catch and days 
fished data are for all landings by all vessels. Appendix I discusses these and the 
economic data. The intrinsic growth rate, r = 0.18, and the environmental carrying 
capacity, K = 250 metric tons, were provided by an albacore population biologist and 
were developed from life history studies, population assessments, and other biological 
research, and can be treated as exogenous. The catchability coefficient, 
  
q, is 0.00526169, 
comes from international stock assessments, and is the weighted average of age-specific 
values of 
  
q for 2,3,4, and 5-year old year classes (one-third weights for 3 and 4 year olds 
and one-sixth weights for 2 and 5 year-olds). The estimates of biomass (resource stock) 
also come from international stock assessments. The albacore landed are largely for the 
canned and blast bled frozen tuna markets and are only small part of the global albacore 
market, which in turn is part of a highly competitive global market for canned tuna from 
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other species, so that the ex-vessel price can safely be viewed as exogenous with respect 
to own landings. Similarly, prices of inputs used by albacore troll vessels can be expected 
constant, since the quantities used are insufficient to affect prices. The ex-vessel albacore 
price and cost per vessel per day (US$2001) were set at the 1981-2006 means, giving 
  
P = $2,852.24 /mt  and 
  
c = $1,268.48 /vessel − day , where 
  
c  includes the operating costs 
of fuel, oil, food, gear, and labor, and capital costs of loan payments and insurance. The 
discount rate is 2.5%. 
To obtain values of the rate of technical change λ and the change in technical 
efficiency 
  
∂µ t,Z( ) ∂t , the following Cobb-Douglas production function was estimated 
using the unbalanced panel data for the U.S. and Canadian fleets’ catch and effort: 
            
  
lnYit =α + β1 lnEit + β2 lnSit + λt + ai + aiEit + vit   ,                                (50) 
where i indexes the individual country, 
  
ai  captures the fixed effect (and is allowed to be 
correlated with 
  
Eit ,Sit  in an unknown correlation structure), in this case Canadian effort, 
and 
  
vit  is an 
  
i.i.d. stochastic disturbance term with a zero mean, finite variance, and 
normal distribution. Technical inefficiency   
  
 u it  is measured semi-parametrically by 
(Schmidt and Sickles 1984):   
  
 u it =max j  a j +  a j E jt( ) −  a i +  a iEit( ), which reduces to the 
relative technical inefficiency between two countries. This approach specifies a time-
varying, non-neutral form of technical inefficiency, a semi-parametric version of Huang 
and Liu (1994). This measure varies over time, because effort varies over time, and is 
non-neutral because the measure varies with effort. Differences between U.S. and 
Canadian vessels reflect differences in biophysical conditions, notably the preponderance 
of albacore in U.S. rather than Canadian waters, requiring Canadian vessels to travel 
longer distances to reach fishing grounds. The limited number of countries in our data set 
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precludes an explicit time-varying semi-parametric specification of technical inefficiency 
-- parameterized as a function of time and even parameters that vary over firms -- and 
still identifying technical progress.36  The limited number of observations also precludes 
evaluating biased technical change. 
 We also estimated a time-varying general index of Hick’s neutral technical 
change as an alternative to the time trend “straightjacket” and to more closely examine 
technical progress and optimum stock size over the range of the data set (Baltagi and 
Griffin 1988). This general index of technical change specifies a dummy variable for 
each year, requires panel data, and is essentially a Solow residual. The production 
function with the general index of Hick’s neutral technical change and country-specific 
dummy variable for Canada to allow for semi-parametric estimation of technical 
inefficiency is specified:37 
    
  
lnYit = β1 lnEit + β2 lnSit + A(t) + ai + vit  ,                           (51) 
where 
  
A t( ) denotes the general index of technical change that varies by year. Because 
  
A t( ) is unobserved, annual dummy variables 
  
Dt  
  
t =1,...,T( ) are used to give: 
   
  
lnYit = β1 lnEit + β2 lnSit + β3Dt + ai + vit  .                           (52) 
The base years consist of 1981-1982 rather than a single year to overcome singularity and 
to obtain plausible estimates with the limited panel and degrees of freedom. The 
restriction 
  
β3 =α + A t( )  is imposed in Equation (52) for estimation. The rate of technical 
change, given by 
  
A(t) − A(t −1), allows for Hick’s-neutral technical change that is not 
constant, comparable to 
  
λt + φt 2  in Equation (50). Taking 1981-1982 as the base period 
for 
  
A t( ), so that 
  
A 1( ) = 0 allows identification of 
  
ai  and the index 
  
A t( ). The general 
index of technical change is calculated following Equation (7) of Baltagi, Griffin, and 
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Rich (1995) as 
  
exp A t( )[ ].38 
 We specify a measure of the composite input, effort, comprised of both days 
fished and the number of vessels as the first stage in a two-stage decision-making 
process. This approach provides an instrumental variable predetermined in the effort 
model that avoids endogeneity issues and reduces multicollinearity when estimating the 
second-stage (Fuss 1977).39 40 Technical progress is not specified in the effort aggregator 
function, but under the linear homogeneity of this function in E, factor-augmenting 
technical change that equally augments each input comprising 
  
Et  is equivalent to output-
augmenting technical change (Thirtle and Ruttan 1987).  
 Two approaches to the linearly homogeneous aggregator function of the 
composite input effort were adopted. The composite input effort was first constructed as a 
Tornqvist chain index of days fished and vessel numbers because the corresponding 
translog functional form for this superlative aggregator function (Diewert 1976) 
corresponds to the separability inflexibility of input-output separability and the Cobb-
Douglas functional form of the catch production frontier (Denny and Fuss 1977).41 
Annual variable input costs shares correspond to the costs of fuel, labor, food, and gear 
and the annual capital cost shares correspond to the capital services prices of the vessels 
(Appendix I). 
The index of unobserved effort was also created, following Fuss (1977) and 
Squires (1987), as a generated regressor (Murphy and Topel 1985), and retrieves the 
actual values of the aggregator function. Consistent with the separability inflexibility of 
the Cobb Douglas catch equation with input-output separability, a linearly homogeneous 
translog effort aggregator function was specified, which gives a superlative effort index 
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equivalent to the Tornqvist discrete approximation to the Divisia. Fitted values from the 
estimated effort aggregator function, Equation (53) below, provide an estimate of effort 
(up to the arbitrary scaling factor 
  
α + ai  in Equation (53)) and predetermined variable for 
unobserved (log of) endogenous effort in the catch frontiers, Equations (50) and (52), and 
allow effort to be exogenous in the second stage of decision-making.42  The translog 
effort aggregator function (with time-invariant technical inefficiency) is: 
    
  
lnEit =α +α1 lnX1it +α2 lnX2it +α12 lnX1it lnX2it + ai + ai1X1it + ai2X2it + εit  ,         (53) 
where 
  
X1it  denotes days fished for country i in time t, a measure of variable input usage, 
  
X2it  denotes the number of vessels for country i in time t, a measure of the capital stock, 
and symmetry is imposed by 
  
α12 =α21.
43  Assuming competitive markets, differentiating 
Equation (53) with respect to 
  
lnX1it  and 
  
lnX2it  yields the cost share equations:  
  
∂ lnEit ∂ lnX1it = M1 =α1 + ai1 +α11 lnX1it +α12 lnX2it                         (54) 
  
∂ lnEit ∂ lnX2it = M2 =α2 + ai1 +α12 lnX1it +α22 lnX2it , 
 where 
  
M1,M2 are the cost shares for days and vessel numbers. Linear homogeneity is 
imposed by 
  
α1 +α2 =1,a1 + a2 = 0,α11 +α12 +α22 = 0.  Since the cost share equations sum 
to unity, the vessel numbers equation is dropped, only the variable input equation is 
estimated by ordinary least squares, and the results are invariant to the choice of dropped 
equation. The variable input cost share equation and the production frontier were 
simultaneously estimated by maximum likelihood. 
The generated regressor approach is preferred to the index number approach, but 
the additional parameterization of the general index approach to technical change 
precludes its use in this instance because of limited observations. Hence, we apply index 
numbers to the general index approach and the generated regressor approach to the time 
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trend specification of technical change. 
The time frame of analysis was 1981-2006 for U.S. vessels and 1995-2006 for 
Canadian vessels to match the availability of data. The data are unbalanced panel. 
 We also estimate a two-factor learning curve that accounts for the stock-flow 
nature of the production technology (since rates of cumulative catch could slow down not 
from declining learning but from lower resource stocks making less catch available for 
accumulation): 
     
  
lnYit =α + β1 ln yi + β2St + ai + εit ,                                         (55) 
where 
  
yi denotes cumulated production in time t. 
10. Empirical Results 
 The catch frontier with constant Hick’s neutral technical change Equation (50) 
using the Tornqvist index of effort was estimated by maximum likelihood with the effort 
coefficient restricted to one (consistent with the Schaefer specification). Evidence of first-
order serial correlation led to maximum likelihood estimation correcting for first-order 
serial correlation.44 A t-test for the null hypothesis that the effort coefficient equals one 
gave a t-value of -6.73, rejecting the null hypothesis; nonetheless, we maintain the 
specification consistent with the classic Gordon-Schaefer model. Parameter estimates of 
Equation (50) are reported in Table 4, 
  
R2 = 0.828 , Canadian vessels are less technically 
efficient, and there is a statistically significant rate of technical change of 4.27 percent (t-
ratio of 2.03).45 This result led to a final specification of constant Hick’s neutral technical 
change in the modified Golden Rule. Given the constant returns to scale for effort 
(coefficient of one) and allowance for technical inefficiency, technical progress is 
equivalent to total factor productivity growth. 
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 The general index of technical change model, Equation (52), using the Tornqvist 
index of unobserved effort and the Schaefer restriction that the effort coefficient equals 
one, was estimated by ordinary least squares with the base period of 1981-1982 rather 
than simply 1981 due to multicollinearity and with a dummy variable for Canada. 
Evidence of serial correlation led to maximum likelihood estimates correcting for first-
order serial correlation.46 A t-test for the null hypothesis that the effort coefficient equals 
one gave a t-value of -16.40858, rejecting the null hypothesis; nonetheless, we again 
maintain the specification consistent with the classic Gordon-Schaefer model. A 
likelihood ratio test that the annual dummy variables are jointly zero was rejected at five 
percent significance (
  
χdf = 24
2 = 54.39, critical value of 36.415). The final parameters 
estimates for Equation (51) are reported in Table 5, 
  
R2 = 0.948, and Canadian vessels are 
statistically less technically efficient than U.S. vessels. 
 The production frontier with constant Hick’s-neutral technical change (50) and 
the variable input cost share equation for the generated regressor index of unobserved 
  
Et  
(54), were jointly estimated by full information maximum likelihood with a serial 
correlation correction for (17a). A likelihood ratio test failed to reject the classic Gordon-
Schaefer specification 
  
β1 =1 (
  
χdf =1
2 = 0.6032), and conditional upon 
  
β1 =1, a likelihood 
ratio test failed to reject 
  
β2 =1 (
  
χdf =1
2 =1.2356). The parameter estimates are reported in 
Table 6 for (54) and Table 7 for (50) with 
  
R2 = 0.92  for (54) and 
  
R2 = 0.83 for (50). The 
Debreu-Farrell best practice frontier defined by U.S. vessels expands at an annual rate of 
3.56 percent due to technical progress.47 Canadian vessels’ state of technology always 
lags behind the expanding frontier. 
 The general index model, Equation (52) using the effort aggregator function (53) 
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had an excessive number of parameters for estimation.  
 The two-factor learning curve, Equation (55), estimated by maximum likelihood 
with a first-order serial correlation correction gave a statistically significant value for the 
natural log of the cumulated production coefficient, indicating an annual rate of technical 
change of 10.89 percent (Table 8).48 Because this value is unrealistically high, we retain 
our focus on the catch frontier approach. Nonetheless, this result reinforces our finding of 
important technical change. 
Figure 5 illustrates northern albacore stocks over a 150-year time horizon with 
constant annual Hick’s neutral technical progress of 3.56 percent for: the fundamental 
equation of renewable resources with static technology 
  
S* ; with technical progress (8) 
  
St* ; 
  
SMSY = K 2; the limit stock over an infinite time horizon with technical progress (9); 
and the open-access equilibrium stock with technical progress (the initial value is the 
open access stock under static technology) 
  
S
∞
TE ,t = c Pqeλt−µ(t ,Z )[ ]. The results clearly 
illustrate the wide divergence between 
  
S* =159.12mt , 
  
St* , 
  
limt→∞ St* =107.64mt , 
  
SMSY =125mt , and 
  
S∞TE ,t , which is 84.52mt in the initial time period and 0.41mt in the fina 
time period. 
  
St* > S*  for a finite number of years, as discussed earlier, before 
  
St*drops 
below 
  
S* , steadily diverging from 
  
S* , and eventually reaches the limit stock. The 
slowing rate of decline with technical progress reflects (11). Notably, the limit stock lies 
below not only 
  
S*  but also
  
SMSY  as the marginal technology effect dominates and steadily 
erodes the marginal stock effect over time. 
  
S*  lies well above 
  
SMSY  due to the marginal 
stock effect and cost savings from keeping fish in the water, but represents an opportunity 
cost of foregone rent with technical progress.   
The effect of technical progress on 
  
S∞TE ,t  in Figure 5 is striking, demonstrating the 
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importance of property rights or an optimum tax, the dangers of ignoring the rapid stock 
decline due to technical progress – especially under open access, and the low levels that 
  
S∞TE ,t  can reach. The current state of high seas fisheries for valuable highly migratory 
species, such as bluefin tunas (which face extinction), reflect rapid technical change 
under open access. The difference 
  
St* − S∞TE ,t  measures the resource stock externality 
under technical change, which increasingly diverges over time due to the march of 
technical progress. However, although steadily diverging, the externality, which begins at 
86.2 mt, levels off at it asymptotically approaches 107.64 mt, as 
  
limt→∞ St* =107.64mt  
and 
  
limt→0 S∞TE ,t = 0mt , i.e. 
  
limt→0 St* − limt→0 StTE ,t = limt→0 St* . Higher rates of technical 
progress exacerbate the external cost under open access by strengthening the resource 
stock externality and hastening the decline in stock size and foregone rents.  
Figure 6 presents optimum yields over 150 years corresponding to the optimum 
resource stocks in Figure 2. 
  
Y * is 10.41 mt and 
  
YMSY = rK 4  is 11.25 mt. Optimum yields 
in the early years of technical progress reflect stock rebuilding and matches 
  
Y2  in Figure 
1. 
  
Yt* >Y * , and the lower costs due to technical progress lead to net benefits to society of 
higher harvest rates than without technical progress in which the only source of lower 
costs is retaining a higher resource stock in the water 
 This relationship between the marginal stock effect and the marginal technology 
effect over 150 years is illustrated in Figure 7. The marginal technology effect in the 
albacore fishery always dominates the marginal stock effect, since 
  
F St( ) St( ) < λ −∂µ t,z( ) ∂t( ) , and the marginal stock effect is minimal and quickly 
eroded through technical change. 
 Different species of fish concentrate (school) differently. Fish are evenly 
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dispersed throughout the ocean when 
  
β2 =1, whereas if the stock schools or contracts as 
it is depleted and preserves its density 
  
β2 = 0  (Hannesson 1993). Values of 1, 0.5, and 0.1 
were assigned to 
  
β2 to reflect the stock’s schooling. The results in Figure 8 indicate an 
even lower optimal stock size for schooling species, reflecting the accelerated effect of 
technical progress on harvests due to concentration of fish and their consequent increased 
ease of location and lower harvest cost. The stock limits for 
  
β2 = 0.1 compared to 
  
β2 =1 
illustrate just how low the optimum stock can become, close to extinction and almost 
indistinguishable from open access, under technical progress and schooling. For some 
schooling and highly valuable species under open access, such as giant bluefin tunas, the 
economic optimum differs little from open access when technical change is considered. 
 The impact of technical change on the optimum tax is illustrated in Figure 9. The 
optimum tax rises over time to level off . With technical change, the optimum tax must be 
updated every time period until the externality narrows enough to be de facto negligible. 
 Figure 10 illustrates the static resource stock externality over 1981-2006, 
developed in Section 4.2. with the linear time trend model and the Tornqvist index of 
effort. This externality is the difference between the marginal and average products of 
effort: 0
),(222
,, <−=−
−
r
eKEq
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Ztt
ttTE
E
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E
µλ
. As expected, technical progress 
exacerbates the external costs over time, although the amount varies according to the 
level of effort and can even increase when the level of effort declines. Higher rates of 
technical progress can be expected to increase the external cost by strengthening the 
resource stock externality, and in principle the social return to technical progress under 
open access can be negative. 
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11. Concluding Remarks 
  Progress in technology and technical efficiency under incomplete property 
rights exacerbates the commons problem, further widening the wedge between the private 
and social costs of resource exploitation – the negative resource stock externality. The 
resource stock declines more rapidly than under static technology, which is hastened 
under resource-using technical change and the more a species schools or concentrates. 
Extinction can also be hastened. The rapid technical progress over the past 150 years 
undoubtedly contributed to the decline of most, if not all, global fisheries. 
 Changes in technology and technical efficiency can markedly alter the optimum 
exploitation of common renewable resources. Accounting for these changes alters the 
fundamental equation of renewable resources or Golden Rule by modifying the existing 
marginal stock effect and introducing the new marginal technology effect. 
 Economically optimum harvest costs that increase with declining stock size can 
be more than balanced by harvest costs declining through progress in technology and 
technical efficiency. The optimal resource stock declines over time to reach, over an 
infinite time horizon, a level that can be notably less than the steady-state economic 
optimum under static technology and even less than the stock of maximum sustainable 
yield,
  
SMSY . This result can markedly differ from conventional wisdom (Grafton et al. 
2007), in which the dynamic economic optimum stock under static technology exceeds 
  
SMSY , in large part due to the marginal stock effect. The realistic possibility of an 
economic optimum stock below 
  
SMSY  also suggests that at least some of the approximate 
75% of global fish stocks that lie at or below MSY (FAO 2006) may not be economically 
overexploited after all, and that from an economic perspective the current crisis in global 
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fisheries may be overstated. The present near-universal policy in global fisheries of 
managing for MSY (sometimes modified by a precautionary level) may in some instances 
be economically sub-optimal by surprisingly favoring stocks too large rather than too 
small, and can create an opportunity cost of forgone rents. Managing renewable resources 
for a non-existent steady-state economic optimum under static technology sets 
inappropriate targets for yields, effort and resource stocks and exacerbates the 
opportunity cost of foregone rents. 
 In sum, accounting for changes in technology and technical efficiency creates the 
potential for turning conventional normative economic fisheries management on its head 
by allowing for the very real possibility of dynamic economic optimum stock sizes below 
  
SMSY , lowering or even removing the importance of retaining fish in the water to reduce 
harvest costs and increase asset value, and shifting the management focus away from 
input to output controls. Nonetheless, sound ecological and biodiversity reasons may well 
argue for larger resource stocks, richer biodiversity, and larger-sized fish (Worm et al. 
2006, Anderson et al. 2008), reinforced by uncertainty, non-convex and nonlinear 
ecosystems, and non-market amenity values. Common resources increasingly require 
management as public goods rather than simply as the historic “commons problem” and 
direct use value. The economic benefits from technological progress can best be fully 
realized under well-developed individual or group property rights on outputs (Costello et 
al. 2008, Heal and Schlenker 2008), but perhaps at lower, sometimes perhaps even much 
lower, resource stock levels than previously believed.  
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Appendix I: The Data 
 
The catch and effort data are those used for the international resource stock assessments 
of North Pacific albacore (McDaniel, Crone, and Dorval 2006). Effort is measured by the 
number of days fishing. Albacore price data, which correspond to each fishing trip’s sales 
from the vessel to fish processors (ex-vessel data), are from all landings of albacore troll 
vessels over 1981-2006 along the Pacific coast of the United States.  
 
Cost data were centered upon a panel of cost data over 1996-1999 for individual troll 
vessels, which the albacore industry collected (Squires et al. 2003) and is discussed 
further below. These benchmark costs reflect the state of technology and technical 
inefficiency over this time period. With the exception of three vessels, the panel data set 
was balanced. To extend the cost data backward to 1981 and forward to 2006, variable 
and fixed input costs per day were assumed to change at the same annual rate as their 
associated input prices. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics economic producer or consumer 
price indices (not seasonally adjusted) were used for labor (compensation: wages and 
salaries for construction, extraction, farming, fishing, and forestry occupations), food 
(Portland-Salem, Oregon-Washington), and gear (machinery and equipment) for periods 
before 1996 and after 1999. The capital service price used that year’s mean daily interest 
rate for seasoned bonds rated Baa by Moody’s. Annual fuel price changes were 
calculated from an average of monthly dockside number two marine diesel fuel prices for 
600 gallons cash price before tax by port for Washington (13 ports), Oregon (7 ports), 
and California (11 ports) over 1981-1988 and 2000-2007. Because actual fuel prices were 
unavailable over 1988-1995, the producer price index for fuels and related products and 
power was used to fill in the gaps. The opportunity cost of labor, discussed in detail 
below, was available for 1981-1985 and 1996-2007 with the gap years filled in by the use 
of the BLS index for construction average hourly earnings, where blue collar work is the 
expected alternative to serving on a vessel. Because effort (and the resource stock) is 
assumed in equilibrium, the capital stock is specified to be in equilibrium in each period, 
leading to the use of a capital services price rather than a quasi-rent to allow for 
variations in capacity utilization. This specification is consistent with the cost per unit 
effort, c, variable in each time period and the implicit assumption of instantaneous entry 
and exit. Capital services prices were constructed using the above interest rate and a 
depreciation rate of seven percent and insured replacement value from the panel data set 
over 1996-1999 All economic data were deflated by the GDP implicit price deflator to 
provide values in $2001.  
 
All variable input cost changes were weighted by the mean 1996-1999 cost shares of 
labor, food, diesel fuel and oil, and gear to provide an index of annual changes for 
variable cost per day, and similarly for the vessel (includes engine, equipment, etc.) for 
the rate of change of Moody’s long-term bond rate rated Baa. The annual rates of variable 
and fixed cost changes per day were used to extend the 1996 observed mean variable and 
fixed cost per day from the panel data set backwards from 1996 and forwards from 1999 
to provide a variable and fixed cost per day of fishing, which when multiplied by each 
year’s total days fished gave the fleet’s annual total cost. The use of these cost-shares 
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implies that the single-product harvest technology was Leontief or fixed over this time 
period for variable and fixed costs, which also satisfies Leontief aggregation theorem for 
a composite input, effort. This Leontief separability is consistent with the homothetic 
input separability of all inputs required to construct the composite input fishing effort. 
The cost shares are independent of the technology index t under implicit Hick’s input 
neutrality. 
 
The panel cost data are from a survey of vessel annual cost-and-earnings for the 
Washington-Oregon-California albacore troll fleet covering the years 1996-1999 
conducted by the American Fishermen’s Research Foundation, the Western Fish Boat 
Owners’ Association, and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), in conjunction 
with the Pacific States Marine Commission (Squires et al. 2003). The survey was based 
on a stratified random sample determined by the Neyman Allocation Method with a finite 
population correction for 95% level of precision (significance) for a 10% error term from 
the mean 1996-97 albacore troll landings (these population data are all landings of fish 
along the Pacific Coast at the point of first sale) for a single year of data, although four 
years of panel data were collected. All strata received small rounding toward the closest 
integer. The sample size was 88, but to allow at least 3 vessels in each sample (to satisfy 
NMFS confidentiality requirements), several strata received additional vessels to give a 
final sample size of 92. The level of precision and error should actually exceed 95% and 
10% for a full sample since four years rather than one year of data were obtained. There 
were 14 strata, which were developed in consultation with the Western Fish Boat 
Owner’s Association. The data were collected double blind to NMFS to insure 
confidentiality and accuracy of the data. A total of 55 surveys received could be 
attributed to one of the 14 strata. An additional 39 surveys received were not attributed to 
any of the 14 strata. The total number of surveys received was 94, 2 more than the 
required 92. The criteria for stratification were: (1) inshore or offshore; (2) state of home 
port; (3) trans-shipping at sea or not; (4) fishing in the South Pacific or no t when fishing 
offshore; and (5), the special category of vessels with PacFIN identifiers of “ZZZ” or 
“none”, denoted “other.” The data for trips of vessels fishing in the South Pacific was 
excluded, because the empirical study focused on the Pacific coast of North America. 
 
Landings of albacore are primarily monitored via the processing facilities (canneries).  
That is, legal requirements dictate that financial transactions associated with 
commercially landed fish must be accounted for by a ‘landing receipt.’  Data from these 
receipts are processed and archived in a centralized data base (Pacific Fisheries 
Information Network or PacFIN) to provide U.S. albacore troll vessels’ landings and ex-
vessel prices. Additionally, the Western Fishboat Owners’ Association (WFOA–albacore 
fishing industry organization) monitors all landings of albacore and maintains an 
independent data base.  Final estimates of commercial landings of albacore are derived 
using both of the data bases above.  It is generally believed that a ‘small’ amount of 
albacore are unaccounted for each year, given that some fishermen do not sell their fish to 
a cannery, but rather, directly to the public (say dockside from their vessel) and 
subsequently, may not document these sales. 
 
U.S. effort data are obtained from log books filled out on a daily basis by U.S. albacore 
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fishers while fishing. Historically, logbooks have not been required to be turned into 
NMFS, and thus each year only a sample of logbooks is collected from a subset of the 
entire population of fishermen, i.e., the sample is strictly non-random and based on 
logbooks that have been voluntarily submitted. 
 
The opportunity cost of labor for an ordinary crewmember is the simple arithmetic mean 
for a number of blue collar labor categories (ranging from 6-10)  that varied by coastal 
county of the state of the vessel’s home port, and these data were obtained from the state 
labor departments for California, Oregon, and Washington. All crewmembers’ 
opportunity cost also included three U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) categories. 
The opportunity cost of labor for the vessel’s captain was the BLS category, “Bus, truck, 
and stationary engine mechanics,” on the assumption that the captain has the skill and 
experience of working the vessel’s engine. This skill is presumed readily transferable to 
other motor engines. This labor category is also one of the highest paid of the alternative 
possible occupations, which would reflect the captain’s human capital comprising of not 
only mechanical skill, but organization and leadership skills and the quasi-rent the 
captain would receive for these skills. Squires et al. (2003) provide further details. 
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Table  1. Expressions for Yield, Stock and Effort at maximum sustainable yield, optimal and open access with output-augmenting 
technical change and static model. 
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Table 2. Expressions for optimal Yield, Stock and Effort with output-augmenting technical change and dynamic model. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of the Data 
Category Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
U.S. Catch (mt) 8,750.86 4,316.87 1,845.00 16,938.35 
U.S. Days Fished 24,226.38 10,195.95 9,146.24 44,774.79 
U.S. Vessel Numbers 732.00 367.19 172.00 1,837.00 
U.S. Composite Effort Tornqvist Index 0.5164 0.2164 0.1860 1.00 
U.S. Variable Input (Days Fished) Cost Share 0.73 0.14 0.50 0.92 
U.S. Capital Cost Share 0.27 0.14 0.08 0.50 
Canada Catch (mt) 3,410.38 2,416.83 139.00 7,856.00 
Canada Days Fished 878.35 984.10 95.88 3,371.29 
Canada Vessel Numbers 187.00 76.09 45.00 295.00 
Canada Composite Effort Tornqvist Index 2.6445 1.9338 0.6110 7.4646 
Canada Variable Input (Days Fished) Cost Share 0.81 0.11 0.67 0.92 
Canada Capital Cost Share 0.19 0.11 0.08 0.33 
Price of Albacore (US$/mt) 2,852.24 505.70 1975.45 3,983.32 
Cost per day (US$/day) 1268.48 255.26 936.90 1978.52 
Biomass from International Stock Assessment (mt) 170,956.98 25,522.07 124,684.19 22,5743.85 
 
Note: Monetary values in US$2001. 
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Table 4. Parameter Estimates of Linear Time Trend Model with  
              Tornqvist Index of Effort, 1981-2006 
 
 Effort Coefficient not Restricted Effort Coefficient = 1 
Parameter Estimate St. Error t-statistic Estimate St. Error t-statistic 
Constant -2.8507 8.4033 0.3392 -7.7721 10.4620 -0.7490 
Dummy Canada -1.8754 0.5974 -3.1393 -2.7323 0.2920 -9.3580 
Effort 0.1245 0.1301 0.9572 1.000   
Biomass 0.9727 0.6956 1.3984 1.4161 0.8752 1.6180 
Trend 0.0446 0.0243 1.8322 0.0427 0.0210 2.0287 
Rho 0.7572 0.1416 5.4025 0.3336 0.1519 2.1958 
  
R2 0.808262   0.827605   
Log-Likelihood -29.1723   -42.1681   
Note: Number of observations = 43.Maximum likelihood estimation with  
Correction for first-order serial correlation. Cobb Douglas functional form  
with linear time trend. 
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Table 5. Parameter Estimates of General Index of Technical Change Model 
              with Tornqvist Index of Effort, 1981-2006 
 
Parameter Estimate St. Error t-statistic 
Constant 36.2217 86.9674 .416497 
Dummy Canada -2.77949 0.265188 -10.4812 
Effort 1.000   
Biomass -2.24909 7.28238 -.308840 
Rho .609177 .121853 4.99927 
D1983 -.070812 .330995 -.213937 
D1984 .474335 .948242 .500225 
D1985 .477752 .584542 .817311 
D1986 .178382 .603761 .295451 
D1987 -.470339 .871398 -.539752 
D1988 .162001 0.555134 .291823 
D1989 -.738228 .945343 -.780910 
D1990 -.710823 1.60617 -.442557 
D1991 -.894899 .832313 -1.07520 
D1992 -.074155 1.47201 -.050377 
D1993 -.549851 1.14332 -.480923 
D1994 .175547 .684737 .256371 
D1995 .586890 1.15904 .506358 
D1996 2.25675 2.84855 .792245 
D1997 1.07411 2.80150 .383406 
D1998 1.92104 1.74271 1.10233 
D1999 1.61324 2.03451 .792937 
D2000 .382128 .697466 .547881 
D2001 .836831 .694556 1.20484 
D2002 1.08690 1.17526 .924817 
D2003 1.28201 .598456 2.14220 
D2004 1.44485 1.58139 .913657 
D2005 .704940 1.72686 .408220 
D2006 2.13323 1.95737 1.08984 
 
Note: Number of observations = 43. Unbalanced panel data, U.S. 1981- 
2006, Canada 1990-2006. Cobb Douglas functional form  with general  
index of technical change and effort coefficient = 1.   
  
R2 = 0.948 . Log-likelihood = -16.8179. Std. error of regression =0.602515. 
Standard Errors computed from heteroscedastic-consistent matrix  
 (Robust-White) 
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Table 6. Parameter Estimates of Translog Effort Aggregator Function 
 
Full information maximum likelihood estimation with first-order serial correlation 
correction joint with catch frontier.  
 
 
 No Restrictions Effort Coefficient= 1 Effort and Stock Coefficients = 1 
Parameter Estimate St. 
Error 
t-statistic Estimate St. 
Error 
t-
statistic 
Estimate St. Error t-statistic 
Constant 0.5157 0.1543 3.34 0.4907 0.1422 3.45 0.4961 0.1262 3.93 
Dummy 
Canada 
-0.2318 0.1164 -1.99 -0.2367 0.0877 -2.70 -0.2346 0.0840 -2.79 
Days 
Fished 
0.0093 0.0091 1.02 0.0072 0.0093 0.78 0.0062 0.0086 0.72 
Number 
of Vessels 
0.0026 0.0146 0.18 0.0078 0.0099 0.79 0.0089 0.0087 1.02 
Rho 1.033 0.0328 31.47 1.0325 0.0304 34.01 1.0325 0.0312 33.08 
  
R2 0.9171   0.9159   0.9158   
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Table 7. Parameter Estimates of Catch Frontier 
 No Restrictions Effort Coefficient = 1 Effort and Stock Coefficients = 1 
Parameter Estimate St. 
Error 
t-
statistic 
Estimate St. 
Error 
t-
statistic 
Estimate St. Error t-statistic 
Constant -6.1134 7.9111 -0.77 -6.0064 8.2430 -0.73 -11.9193 0.6438 -18.52 
Dummy 
Canada 
-4.4927 2.4217 -1.86 -3.4666 1.6889 -2.05 -3.2852 1.7343 -1.89 
Dummy 
Canada*Effort 
1.6931 0.9160 1.85 1.2529 0.2319 5.40 1.1934 0.2428 4.92 
Effort 0.7784 0.3415 2.28 1.0000   1.0000   
Biomass 0.6280 0.7446 0.84 0.4952 0.6980 0.71 1.0000   
Trend 0.0389 0.0121 3.22 0.3896 0.0116 3.36 0.0356 0.0111 3.21 
Likelihood 57.6471   57.3455   57.3455   
  
R2 0.8278   0.8333   0.8331   
Note: Number of observations = 43. Full information maximum likelihood estimation 
jointl with effort aggregator function.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Parameter Estimates of Two-Factor Learning Curve, 1981-2006 
 
Parameter Estimate St. Error t-statistic 
Constant 6.60755 1.38302 4.77762 
Dummy Canada 1.26423 .612536 2.06393 
Cumulative Catch .108867 .047989 2.26857 
Biomass -.125511 .110088 -1.14010 
Rho .983322 .015283 64.3390 
Note: Number of observations = 43. Maximum likelihood estimation with 
correction for first-order serial correlation. 
  
R2 = 0.957. Log likelihood = 42.2637. 
Std. error of regression = .140768. 
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 Figure 5. Optimum stock size over a 150-year time horizon 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Optimum yield over a 150-year time horizon 
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Figure 7. Marginal stock and technology effects in modified Golden Rule 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Optimum resource stocks with technical change and schooling 
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Figure 9. Optimum Tax 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Static Stock Externality, 1981-2006 
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Endnotes 
                                                
1 See, for example, the following representative classics of renewable resource 
economics: Gordon (1954), Scott (1955), Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Dasgupta (1982), 
Clark (1990), and Hannesson (1993). Dasgupta (1982) explicitly holds technology 
constant. Brown (2000), in an authoritative survey, mentions in passing that optimal 
technology is assumed fixed in normative models. There is also a literature on trade, 
renewable resources, economic growth, and technical change introduced by Brander and 
Taylor (1998), reviewed by McAusland (2005), but it is not germane to the present 
discussion on normative utilization of common renewable resources. 
 
2 Whitmarsh (1980) and Ruttan (2001) qualitatively discussed technical change with 
common renewable resources, with Whitmarsh stressing transferable property rights in 
outputs, a conclusion also reached by Murray (2007) and this paper. Squires (1992) and a 
subsequent positive economics literature evaluated productivity growth when explicitly 
accounting for the resource stock. Jensen (2007) examined the impact of cell phones on 
artisanal fishers. Technical inefficiency in a positive framework was introduced by 
Hannesson (1983) through a deterministic frontier and extended to the stochastic frontier 
by Kirkley et al. (1998), but has not yet been introduced into a normative framework. 
 
3 Scale efficiency arises when price equals marginal cost. In the standard bioeconomic 
model, assumptions of homothetic separability between inputs and outputs and joint 
production are imposed to form an aggregate output and an aggregate input (Squires 
1987). Consequently, profit or rent efficiency in the renewable resource economics 
literature -- the traditional Pareto optimum or Maximum Economic Yield -- reduces to 
only scale efficiency, and technical efficiency and allocative efficiency for multiple 
inputs and for multiple outputs are overlooked as sources of economic efficiency. This 
paper introduces technical efficiency, but allocative inefficiency in the second stage of 
production is inherently prohibited because of the input-output separability. 
 
4 This classic Gordon-Schaefer model specifies a composite input, fishing effort, with an 
exponent of one, and a composite output, catch, a composite measure of resource 
abundance, biomass, also with an exponent of one, static technology, and no allowance 
for technical inefficiency. Marginal costs increasing in the harvest rate require an 
exponent less than one for effort. Subsequent refinements introduce demographic features 
of the population (age structure), non-instantaneous entry and exit, investment, and 
further features (Clark 1990, Hannesson 1993, Brown 2000), but our focus is on 
analytically developing the modified fundamental equation of renewable resource 
economics to clearly demonstrate the effect of changes in technology and technical 
efficiency. The specification of a classic Gordon-Schaefer model leads to an optimization 
model is linear in the control Y, but the optimal stock and harvest rate is nonetheless not 
linear, and instead varies continuously with changes in technology and technical 
efficiency. Nonlinearity in E yields a marginal cost function that is non-linear in Y, but 
analytical solutions are not possible for the augmented fundamental equation of 
renewable resource economics, and the fundamental point of this paper is unchanged. 
 
5 The main omissions are embodied technical change, endogenous technical change, 
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jump-diffusion (diffusion is currently incorporated by technical inefficiency), costs 
nonlinear in the control variable (following from non-linear effort), and stochasticity, all 
subjects of future research and given our focus on the classical renewable resource model 
based on Gordon (1954) and Schaefer (1957). As we discuss below, the majority of 
technical change in fishing industries is likely to be autonomous rather than endogenous 
because of research and development activities by firms. We leave for future work 
analysis, in the presence of weak or nonexistent resource policies, of investments in the 
development and diffusion of new environmentally beneficial technologies (which are 
likely to be less than would be socially desirable). We further leave for the future the 
analysis of the impact of positive knowledge and adoption spillovers and information 
problems that can affect innovation incentives, and in general knowledge market failures. 
 
6 Rapid advancements in fishing technologies led to increased fishing pressure on all fish 
stocks in the 20th century.  Mechanical power for vessels replaced sail power, which 
allowed the development of new types of gear and substantially larger vessels and gear 
and the exploitation of fish stocks in previously inaccessible ocean locations and depths 
and at substantially higher levels of productivity. Synthetic materials for gear and the 
power block in the 1950s were also critical. Vessel electronics, such as sonar, 
chromoscopes, satellite imaging, cell phones, and GPS, help communications, navigation, 
locate fish, monitor gear performance while fishing, and develop markets. The vast 
majority of large, industrial-scale vessels were constructed between about 1960-1990. 
Local traditional knowledge has in many instances been succeeded by the technology-
based knowledge of modern electronic equipment, communications, and satellites. 
 
7 The usual regularity conditions for a production function are assumed (Dasgupta 1982, 
p. 125): a single-valued continuous function with continuous first and second partial 
derivatives; 
  
0 = f (St ,0) = f (0,Et ); positive first partial derivatives 
  
(∂Yt ∂St > 0,∂Yt ∂Et > 0); concavity in 
  
St and quasi-concavity in
  
Et , so that for the own 
second partial derivatives 
  
(∂ 2Yt ∂St2 < 0,∂ 2Yt ∂Et2 ≤ 0); and a non-negative mixed second 
partial derivative 
  
∂ 2Yt ∂St ∂Et = ∂ 2Yt ∂Et ∂St ≠ 0,where symmetry is assumed. 
  
Yt = f (St ,Et ) is bounded from above by the size of the fish stock. Crowding or 
congestion of vessels occurs when 
  
∂Yt ∂Et < 0and the opposite when 
  
∂Yt ∂Et > 0  
(Dasgupta and Heal 1979) and 
  
∂Yt ∂St ≤ 0  is expected in a stock-flow production 
technology. 
 
8 The authors are grateful to Pat Tomlinson for this definition. q converts, in a Hick’s-
neutral manner, the level of 
  
Et  to the proportion of 
  
St  removed and captures changes in 
technology, technical efficiency, the environment, and other factors not captured by 
  
Et .  
 
9 Output-oriented technical efficiency measures the potential increase in output given the 
current level of input. In fishing industries, it captures skipper skill, including the ability 
to find and harvest fish, catching up to the best-practice production frontier that is 
shifting due to technical change, and the impact of some regulations designed to lower 
technical efficiency to reduce fishing mortality (Kirkley et al. 1998). When technical 
inefficiency is due to an expanding frontier – especially with learning by doing, rates of 
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adoption and hence gains in technical efficiency may diffuse more slowly than when 
regulatory induced. Conversely, the competitive pressures induced by market failure with 
common resources and incomplete property rights could hasten the pace of diffusion 
(Smith 1972, Ruttan 2001). 
 
10 Squires (1992) and Arrow et al. (2006) analyze the importance of disentangling 
changes in the natural resource stock from changes in technology when evaluating 
changes in productivity. Disembodied technical change may easily predominate over 
embodied technical change, as found by Kirkley et al. (2004) in the only positive analysis 
of both types of technical change in a  renewable resource, in this case a fishery.  
 
11 Technological change 
  
A(t)in the form of process innovations affecting 
  
Et  in a 
production function of the form 
  
Yt = A(t)F(St ,Et )  is both Hick’s-neutral and output 
augmenting (Lau 1978, p. 204). Letting 
  
A(t) = qλ(t) = qeλt , where the latter term denotes 
a constant rate of technical change 
  
λ , denotes output-augmenting technical change in the 
Graham-Schaefer production frontier 
  
Yt = qeλtSt Et = qStEteλt  (ignoring technical 
inefficiency). Because of the weak homothetic input separability allowing the formation 
of a consistent composite input 
  
Et  (and usually the stronger condition of input-output --- 
and hence strong -- separability when there are multiple outputs such as species or sizes 
or fish), and the linear homogeneity of the input aggregator function required for a 
consistent composite input index, biased technical change among the input pairs 
comprising 
  
Et  in a first stage of production is impossible, i.e. technical change is implicit 
Hick’s neutral among all input pairs comprising E (under implicit Hicks input neutrality, 
the marginal rate of substitution between any inputs is independent of the technology 
index t, and the resource stock 
  
Bt ), and changes in the scale of production do not affect 
input ratios. The Graham-Schaefer form 
  
Yt = A(t)StEt  is strongly separable in 
  
Et , which 
provides Hick’s (and Harrod and Solow) neutrality for 
  
Et , and which Blackorby, Lovell, 
and Thursby (1976) call extended Hick’s-neutral technological change (allowing a 
multiplicative decomposition of the production function into one term involving input 
variables only and another involving the state-of-technology variable only and is 
expansion-path-preserving; extending this definition to an independent resource stock is 
straightforward). Moreover, when the aggregator function of individual inputs 
comprising 
  
Et  is linear homogeneous, as with the Graham-Schaefer production frontier, 
factor-augmenting technical change that equally augments each input comprising 
  
Et  is 
equivalent to output-augmenting technical change (cf. Thirtle and Ruttan 1987, pp. 13-
14).  
 
12 Interest in the sources of neutral or biased technical change could be accommodated by 
replacing the time-oriented terms described above with one or more proxy measures (H) 
for proposed sources of technical change. This is one way of specifying embodied 
technical change, but faces potential omitted variable bias. 
 
13 We develop this discussion heuristically rather than through a formal model of learning 
by doing, which is beyond the scope of this paper’s focus, although we estimate a two-
factor learning curve in the empirical analysis. See McAusland (2005) for a formal model 
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of learning by doing with renewable natural resources but with a focus on growth of an 
economy. We further abstract from incentives to adopt technology due to the state of 
property rights and other factors. 
 
14 The nature and scale of fisheries production makes it difficult to restrict information 
about new technology or practices. Moreover, even the largest vessels or fishing firms are 
relatively small units and are not able to capture more than a small share of the gains 
from inventive activity. Under the incomplete or absent use rights characterizing most 
fishing industries, the private benefits to research and development to advance the state of 
technology cannot be captured by private firms for any length of time but can provide a 
temporary competitive advantage in the race to fish (Smith 1972, Ruttan 2001).  
Organized private research activities in fishing industries have been minimal, and instead 
have largely consisted of adopting “off-the-shelf” innovations such as sonar, GPS, or the 
acoustic imaging technologies.  
15 The logistic growth function is ⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡ −=
K
SrSSF ttt 1)( . 
16 Technical progress that increases the intrinsic rate of growth, such as through genetic 
research or animal breeding, could be specified as 
  
r t( ) or more concretely as 
  
reλt  
(McAusland 2005). 
 
17 Murray (2007) makes this point through simulation. McAusland (2005) finds the same 
result. 
 
18 Remember that technical efficiency is equal to ),( Zte µ− . 
 
19 Stage II of Production for a classic production function occurs when there is a positive 
marginal product of an input over the input range between that corresponding to the 
maximum average product to the marginal product equal to zero. With the Schaefer 
yield-effort function, the average product of the single, composite input effort, 
  
APE =Y E , as a ray from the origin, is found as effort approaches zero, and 
  
MPE > 0  for 
  
0 < E < EMSY , where MSY denotes maximum sustainable yield. Moreover, 
  
MPE = 0 at 
  
EMSY  and 
  
MPE < 0 when 
  
E > EMSY . With an Allee effect, the lower bound occurs at the 
level of effort corresponding to the minimum viable population level. A depensatory 
growth function, which has an inflection point, allows the maximum 
  
MPE  to occur 
before the maximum 
  
APE  as in the classic production case. With pure compensation 
growth, maximum 
  
APE  and maximum 
  
MPE  coincide, differing slightly from the lower 
bound of Stage II. 
 
20 
  
MPETE ,t > (<)0  when 
  
E < (>)EMSYTE ,t , which occurs on the upward (downward) sloping 
part of the yield-effort frontier in Figure 1. 
 
21 The rate of cost diminution overstates (understates) the rate of technical change if there 
exists decreasing (increasing) returns to size and exactly measures the rate of technical 
change only if there exist constant returns to size (Chambers 1988, p. 215). There are 
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constant returns to size in E with the Graham-Schaefer production frontier since the 
production coefficient is 1. Thus the primal and dual rates of technical progress are equal 
since 
  
∂ lnYt ∂ lnEt = ∂ lnCt ∂ lnYt = 0 . Non-linear E leads to numerical solutions of the 
modified Golden Rule and a discrepancy between the rate of technical change and returns 
to size or scale. 
 
22  From Chambers, p. 227, Hicks neutrality, cost neutrality, and profit neutrality are the 
same phenomenon only when the technology is also homothetic (in our case it is linear 
homogeneous in E, an even stronger condition). Cost neutrality means that optimal input 
ratios for either the cost minimizer or the profit maximizer are independent of the state of 
technology so long as output is held constant. (Chambers pp. 224-225) Profit-neutral 
technical change leaves profit-maximizing input ratios undisturbed (Chambers p. 224). 
 
23 This result also holds in steady-state equilibrium of the static model. Under open 
access, substitute from (15) to give 
  
∂ 2TC ∂S∂t = λYP 2qeλt−µ( t ) c > 0. A similar result 
holds for the static Pareto optimum of the sole owner. 
 
24 Since 
  
MRE = PMPE  for a constant P, this is the same result found with 
  
MPE . 
 
25 Technical inefficiency with the sole owner might be viewed as a regression in fishing 
skill or changes in fleet composition (with less technically efficient vessels), or less 
technically efficiency along the linear expansion path of the individual inputs comprising 
effort, given a state of technology and resource stock, compared to a previous time 
period. 
 
26 Second-order conditions are automatically satisfied with a quadratic function. 
 
27 This is a standard model. See, for example, Brown (2000), Clark (1990), Dasgupta 
(1982), Dasgupta and Heal (1979), or Hannesson (1993). 
 
28 The unit profit of harvest – the marginal value of the population – is an increasing 
function of S, as in the traditional rule, but is now also an increasing function of 
  
λ , i.e. 
  
∂ pqSeλt−µ(t ,z) − c[ ] ∂S = pqeλt−µ( t,z ) > 0  and 
  
∂ pqSeλt−µ(t ,z) − c[ ] ∂t = λpSqeλt−µ(t ,z) > 0 . 
 
29 The specification of a linear cost function, 
  
TC = cE , in this standard textbook 
specification, which gives a cost function 
  
TC = c eλt−µ(t ,Z )[ ] Y qS[ ]  that in turn leads to a 
Hamiltonian linear in the control variable Y, in part affects the interaction between the 
marginal stock effect and the marginal technology effect. A nonlinear cost specification 
allowing for increasing marginal costs in Y with diminished stock size could potentially 
and increasingly counter the marginal technology effect as stock sizes decline, through 
growing importance of the marginal stock effect relative to the marginal technology 
effect at low levels of resource abundance. We address this relationship in subsequent 
research, but note that the main results of this paper can be expected to hold but with a 
slower rate of resource stock decline and a higher resource stock level over an infinite 
time horizon in the limit case.  
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30 It depends in the traditional model on the relative size of the discount rate and the 
marginal stock effect. If the discount rate is lower than the marginal stock effect the 
optimal stock level is higher than MSY-level. 
 
31 Which it should be, because as time approaches infinity in Equation (41) the marginal 
stock effect and the marginal technical effect approach zero. 
 
32 We are comparing the optimal yield paths in equilibrium. If the stock level is not in 
optimum, the solution is bang-bang or the most rapid approach, where the stock level is 
adjusted as quickly as possible to the equilibrium. 
 
33 ∞∞ YandS indicate the level of stock and yield respectively when time goes to infinity. 
 
34 Differentiate the unit cost with respect to time gives an expression whose sign depends 
on the relative size of SS
•
and λ. From equation (43) it can be seen that SS
•
is 
numerically less than λ. 
 
35 In reality, the ITQ policy is preferred by the fishermen instead of the tax policy, 
because the benefits of the ownership of the quotas go to the firm in the fishery when the 
ITQ system is implemented. 
 
36 The semi-parametric approach has an advantage over the stochastic frontier function in 
that misspecification of production dynamics is a basic problem that is seldom addressed 
in frontier models, and we were concerned with the construction of the generated 
composite effort variable and with serial correlation with a long time series of annual 
data. Moreover, econometric estimates are all heteroscedastic-consistent. 
 
37 With the Cobb-Douglas functional form, this specification is equivalent to that of 
Baltagi, Griffin, and Rich 1995). Intertemporal firm-specific technical efficiency and 
technical change effects can be obtained by using fitted values of the disturbance term 
  
vit  
in 
  
Ait = A t( ) + ai + vit  to obtain the index 
  
TIit = e−Ait , where changes in 
  
Ait  imply 
percentage changes (Baltagi, Griffin, and Rich 1995).  
 
38 A chain index of technical change can be calculated as 
  
Tt = Tt−1 exp A t( ) − A t −1( )( )( ) . 
For t = 3, 
  
T4 = e0 •eA 2( )−0 •eA 3( )−A 2( ) •eA 4( )−A 3( ) = e0+A 2( ) +A 3( )−A 2( ) +A 4( )−A 3( ) = eA 4( ) . 
 
39 Given weak separability of an input bundle, Fuss (1977, page 91, footnote 7) states, 
“Homotheticity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of the two stage 
procedure. The further restriction of linear homogeneity is required to ensure that the 
product of the aggregate price and quantity indices equal total cost of the components.” 
The latter corresponds to Fisher’s factor reversal test. The index is not equal to a simple 
weighted average of the components unless the components are perfect substitutes or 
complements (Fuss 1977). 
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40 Resource stock is treated as exogenous in the production model because it was 
estimated by a Box-VPA model using Pacific-wide data on multiple gear types, so that 
considerable exogenous information (e.g. age structure of the population, length-weight 
relationships, recruitment, information from other nations, etc.) and exogenous 
assumptions about the population dynamics were the basis of the stock estimates rather 
than simply the catch and effort (days fished) data from a surplus production model for 
the North American Pacific coast for troll gear. 
 
41 The superlative Tornqvist index is not self-dual, and in that regard does not satisfy 
Fisher’s factor-reversal test, but it does so only by a small order of approximation. 
Moreover, the direct quantity and indirect price forms do satisfy the factor-reversal test, 
and we are only concerned with the direct quantity index of effort. Moreover, we are not 
concerned with multilateral comparisons between the U.S. and Canada, and hence we 
calculate direct bilateral quantity indices for each country. Finally, the Tornqvist index, 
which provides a discrete approximation to the Divisia index, is based on a translog 
technology (Diewert 1976). 
 
42 The index is subject to a base period normalization, such as all effort component 
quantities equal to unity (standard for quantity indices). Since the aggregate effort index 
is unique only up to a scalar multiple (since 
  
α + ai  cannot be identified from Equation 
(52)), 
  
α + ai  in Equation (52) is also set equal to unity. The effort aggregator function 
becomes equal to Equation (52) without 
  
α + ai , which is simply the normalized form of 
Equation (52) (Fuss 1977). 
 
43  Implicitly, the capital stock is assumed to be in full static equilibrium. Moreover, since 
the aggregate effort index is unique only up to a scalar multiple, 
  
α  in the effort 
aggregator function equals unity (Fuss 1977). 
 
44 The Durbin-Watson value of 0.935098 indicates first-order serial correlation. The 
regression   
  
 ν it = ρ
 ν it−1 +ηit , where   
  
 ν it ,  ν it−1 are the current and lagged one-period residuals 
from Equation (50) and 
  
ηit  is a random error, gave a t-ratio of 3.0518 for the null 
hypothesis 
  
θ = 0, providing confirming evidence of first-order serial correlation. The first 
observation was retained in the serial correlation correction. 
 
45 Allowing for technical change that is non-constant (giving the additional term 
  
t 2) or 
interacting with 
  
Et  and/or 
  
St  (adding the terms
  
Ett,Stt ) and a full translog model, gave 
implausible and in some instances statistically insignificant results due to the introduced 
multicollinearity. 
 
46 The Durbin Watson value was 0 .798669. The regression   
  
 ν it = ρ
 ν it−1 +ηit , where 
  
  
 ν it ,  ν it−1 are the current and lagged one-period residuals from Equation (51) and 
  
ηit  is a 
random error, gave a t-ratio of 11.9617 for the null hypothesis 
  
θ = 0, providing 
confirming evidence of first-order serial correlation. The first observation was retained in 
the serial correlation correction. 
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47 Industry experts confirmed this comparatively high rate of technical change as 
reasonable. The high rate is due to increased understanding of ocean conditions allowing 
forecasting of fish locations through temperature sensing devices reinforced by satellites, 
improvements in interpretation, and GPS, all of which give information about the overall 
distribution of albacore, dramatically reduces searching, and eases finding schools below 
the surface. Improved communications allows sharing of information among members of 
code groups, reducing search time, and increasing catch rates. Acoustic devices, such as 
sounders, are also increasingly sophisticated. The gear itself remained static. Improved 
weather forecasts extend the end of the fishing season. 
 
48 The Durbin Watson value was 0 .117511. The regression   
  
 ν it = ρ
 ν it−1 +ηit , where 
  
  
 ν it ,  ν it−1 are the current and lagged one-period residuals from Equation (51) and 
  
ηit  is a 
random error, gave a t-ratio of 13.9036 for the null hypothesis 
  
θ = 0, providing 
confirming evidence of first-order serial correlation. The first observation was retained in 
the serial correlation correction. 
 
